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First Nations peoples assert a right to a distinctive relationship with the state based on their
pre-colonial status as self-governing sovereign communities. Ascertaining the scope of
First Nations peoples’ collective right to self-determination is complex, but there is broad
international agreement that it encompasses a right to be consulted on state action that will
affect their interests, including in the law-making process. The problem is that the right to
be consulted in the development of legislation appears to place a constraint on the power of
the legislature to propose, debate, amend, and enact laws as they see fit. Does the right to
consultation unduly or impermissibly fetter democratic government by imposing a procedural
or substantive restriction on the introduction of proposed laws? Can this entitlement be
reconciled with the constitutional value of parliamentary supremacy? In recent years,
the highest courts in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand have explored these
questions. This paper examines those decisions and considers their consequences for the
appropriate constitutional relationship between First Nations Peoples and the State.
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MUST PARLIAMENT CONSULT WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES before debating or

enacting legislation that will affect their rights? In recent years, the highest courts
in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand have considered this question.
In Maloney v. The Queen,1 an Aboriginal woman argued that a Queensland
statute prohibiting the possession of alcohol in an Indigenous community was
inconsistent with a federal law against racial discrimination, because it was
implemented without the adequate consultation of her community. In Mikisew
Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor General in Council),2 the Mikisew Cree
sought a declaration that the Canadian Crown owed and breached a duty to
consult Indigenous peoples when preparing and enacting legislation that may
adversely affect their constitutionally protected treaty rights. Finally, in Ngāti
Whātua Ōrākei Trust v. Attorney General,3 the Ngāti Whātua iwi challenged a
government proposal to transfer land within the Auckland isthmus to the Ngāti
Paoa and Marutūāhu iwis via legislation without their consultation as a breach
of their Settlement Act.4
The underlying legal dispute, let alone the constitutional framework in
which that dispute emerged, differs considerably in each case. When considered
together, however, these three cases shed light on several major public law
issues, including the nature or character of Indigenous peoples’ rights, their
1.
2.
3.
4.

Maloney v The Queen, [2013] HCA 28 [Maloney HCA].
2018 SCC 40 [Mikisew Cree].
Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General, [2018] NZSC 84 [Ngāti Whātua].
Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Claims Settlement Act 2012 (NZ), 2012/91.
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intersection with Westminster-derived constitutional principles, and the role of
the legislature in upholding duties owed by the state to Indigenous peoples and
communities. At their core, Maloney, Mikisew Cree, and Ngāti Whātua centred
on a tension between parliamentary supremacy and Indigenous peoples’ right to
self-determination. While the force of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy
has waned over time, it remains a foundational constitutional value that does not
simply underpin the political and legal framework of each state, but articulates
a particular theory and manner of democratic governance. Parliamentary
supremacy undergirds the egalitarian notion that “ordinary people have a right
to participate on equal terms in the political decision-making that affects their
lives.”5 But what happens when legislation will affect one community specifically,
and what happens when that community is normatively distinct?
Indigenous peoples assert a right to a distinctive relationship with the state
based on their pre-colonial status as self-governing sovereign communities.
Indigenous nations have never ceded their sovereignty and they continue to
exercise their inherent right to self-government in a myriad of ways. Ascertaining
the scope of Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination is complex,
but there is broad international agreement that it encompasses a right to be
consulted on state action that will affect their interests. Under Article 19 of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), states
are obliged to “consult and cooperate” with Indigenous communities “before
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect
them.”6 The problem is that Indigenous peoples’ right to be consulted on the
development of legislation appears to place a constraint on the power of the
legislature to propose, debate, amend, and enact laws as it sees fit. Does the
right to consultation unduly or impermissibly fetter democratic governance by
imposing a procedural (and perhaps substantive) restriction on the introduction
of proposed laws? Can this entitlement be reconciled with the normative
commitment underlying the value of parliamentary supremacy?
Articulating the dispute in this manner reveals that Maloney, Mikisew
Cree, and Ngāti Whātua illuminate a fundamental question concerning the
appropriate constitutional relationship between Indigenous peoples and the
state. Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand were built on a foundational
illegitimacy that has not been resolved. Each state was formed through the
5.
6.

Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (Cambridge
University, 2010) at 9.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR,
61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007) 16 at 20 [UNDRIP].
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unjust dispossession of Indigenous peoples and communities. That dispossession
encompassed the usurpation of Indigenous peoples’ land and the displacement
of Indigenous communities’ governing systems. In their stead, legal and political
systems developed in and for the United Kingdom were replicated and planted
in new soils.7 Despite some effort to modify these arrangements to recognize
the unique position of Indigenous peoples, these colonial frameworks continue
to structure the “legal imagination” in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New
Zealand by establishing and maintaining a hierarchal relationship between the
state and Indigenous peoples.8 Maloney, Mikisew Cree, and Ngāti Whātua offered
an opportunity to revisit and reconsider this fundamental tension by examining
whether and how Indigenous peoples and communities could be involved in law
making on issues that affect their rights and interests. In this article, I explore how
the highest courts in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand responded
to this tension.
I begin in Part I by examining the two key principles that form the backdrop
to this issue: parliamentary supremacy and Indigenous self-determination.
As I argue, a doctrine of parliamentary supremacy may exist in a qualified form
in each settler state, but an underlying normative commitment to parliamentary
supremacy as a constitutional ethic or value continues to operate in at least two
ways. First, parliamentary supremacy influences conceptions of the judicial role.
Parliament is the master in its own domain, as courts remain reluctant to interfere
with the legislature’s internal procedures or to ensure that particular processes are
followed when introducing and debating legislation.9 Second, a broader ethic of
parliamentary supremacy shapes understandings of public power. Parliamentary
supremacy constructs a singular “people,” levelling distinctions among the citizens
in a manner that also elides the existence of overlapping political communities.
These two conditions function to marginalise Indigenous peoples’ inherent right
to self-determination. Together they deny Indigenous peoples and communities
their status as distinct polities and their consequent right to participate in
law-making over matters that affect their interests.
Having outlined the general contours of settler-state parliamentary
supremacy and Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, Part II examines
7.
8.

9.

James Tully, “Modern Constitutional Democracy and Imperialism” (2008) 46 Osgoode
Hall LJ 461 at 481.
Patrick Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal
Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill LJ 382 at 394-95; Joshua Nichols & Robert Hamilton, “In
Search of Honourable Crowns and Legitimate Constitutions: Mikisew Cree First Nation v
Canada and the Colonial Constitution” (2020) 70 UTLJ 341.
Subject, of course, to manner and form provisions.
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the case studies in detail. Situating my discussion in the politico-legal framework
of each state, I tease out how the highest courts in Australia, Canada, and
Aotearoa New Zealand have dealt with potential clashes between these two
principles. As I demonstrate, state courts have adopted a position that prioritizes
parliamentary supremacy and marginalizes Indigenous peoples’ legitimate
claims for political authority. By disregarding Indigenous peoples’ normative
distinctiveness, the courts subsume Indigenous peoples within the larger citizenry.
In Part III, I sketch an alternative path. Acknowledging that diverse
constitutional frameworks make it difficult to outline a coherent common
doctrinal trail, I stake out an approach from first principles. If Indigenous peoples
are entitled at international law to exercise self-determination, and the state has
accepted that position, what follows from this right? Framing the question in
this manner shifts our thinking away from conflict to cooperation. Rather than
conceive these disputes as challenges to the authority of parliament to introduce
and enact legislation, the state should understand them as an invitation to dialogue
and discussion between political communities that prompts two questions. Is this
issue one in which Indigenous communities should be heard? If yes, how can their
right to be heard be given effect? In some cases, though perhaps not all, this may
require the legislature to consider the views of Indigenous peoples. Recognizing
that operationalizing this right is difficult in practice, my approach does not seek
to outline a fixed arrangement but to explore how the relationship between the
state and Indigenous peoples can be reconstituted so as to make conceptual and
legal space for the exercise of multiple, overlapping sovereignties.

I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
A. PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY IN SETTLER-STATE GOVERNANCE

Law and government in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand operate
against a set of shared constitutional traditions derived from the Parliament at
Westminster in the United Kingdom. One tradition central to the constitutional
theory of the United Kingdom is the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,
or parliamentary sovereignty. In the words of its most significant exponent,
A.V. Dicey, parliamentary sovereignty is “the dominant characteristic of our
political institutions,”10 a “fundamental dogma of English constitutional law,”11
10. See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed (Macmillan,
1915) at xxxvi.
11. Ibid at 78.
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and “the very keystone” of the Constitution.12 The doctrine emerged over
centuries in tandem with the gradual evolution of the idea that government
authority derives from popular consent rather than the divine right of kings.
As the institution of government most representative of the political community
(even if that political community was limited by severe restrictions to the
franchise), Parliament ultimately stood alone from the judiciary and the Crown
in its law-making authority. Successive legislative reforms liberalizing the
franchise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries solidified the doctrine’s
philosophical justification.
In his canonical formulation, Dicey outlined an absolutist conception. For
Dicey, parliamentary sovereignty meant that Parliament has “the right to make
or unmake any law whatever,”13 and, as a corollary, “no person or body” has “a
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”14 Put another way, “a
legislature is sovereign provided that its law-making authority is not limited in any
substantive respect.”15 Contemporary scholars question whether Westminster’s
sovereignty has ever “been as clear and absolute as is often made out,”16 but
the doctrine nonetheless remains central to understandings of British public
law. As Lord Neuberger explained recently in R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for
Exiting the European Union, parliamentary sovereignty stands as “a fundamental
principle of the UK constitution.”17 Significantly for our purposes, the principle
is also a central value of the constitutional frameworks of Australia, Canada,
and Aotearoa New Zealand. As I outline, although the particular scope and
application of the doctrine differs across and between each state, it remains
an underlying constitutional norm or ethic that shapes the exercise of public
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Ibid at 25.
Ibid at xxxvi.
Ibid.
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford University Press, 1999) at 15.
Peter C Oliver, “Parliamentary Sovereignty, Federalism and the Commonwealth” in Robert
Schütze & Stephen Tierney, eds, The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart, 2018) 49
at 69. See also Michael Gordon, Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process,
Politics and Democracy (Hart, 2015); Nicholas W Barber, “The Afterlife of Parliamentary
Sovereignty” (2011) 9 Int J Constitutional L 144; TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The
Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 1993); Lord Woolf,
“Droit Public—English Style” (1995) Pub L 57; Mark Elliott, “Parliamentary Sovereignty
and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality and Convention”
(2002) 22 LS 340.
17. [2017] UKSC 5 at para 43, Neuberger LJ. See generally R (on the application of Miller) v The
Prime Minister, [2019] UKSC 41 at para 42 [Miller No 2]. For academic support, see Tom
Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) at 160-62; Gordon, supra note 16 at 23.
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power. That exercise can inhibit the ability of distinct (and demographically
smaller) normative communities from exercising their own inherent right to
self-government.
1.

A QUALIFIED PRINCIPLE

Parliamentary supremacy structures the exercise of public power in Aotearoa
New Zealand. As a unitary state with no codified constitution, the principle
exerts a particular controlling force. The Constitution Act 1986 (New Zealand)
recognizes and affirms that the Parliament has “full power to make laws,”18 and no
institution is empowered to invalidate or refuse to apply any law that Parliament
enacts.19 Indeed, as the Court of Appeal held in Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd
v. Attorney-General:
[t]he Constitutional position is New Zealand…is clear and unambiguous.
Parliament is supreme and the function of the courts is to interpret the law as laid
down by Parliament. The courts do not have a power to consider the validity of
properly enacted laws.20

Nonetheless, perhaps reflecting this increasingly anomalous position globally,
scholars and jurists have sought to identify express or implicit substantive limits
to Parliament’s authority. For example, senior judges have suggested that “some
common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not
override them,”21 while others have explored whether foundational constitutional
values, such as representative democracy and the rule of law, may effectively limit

18. Constitution Act 1986 (NZ), 1986/114, s 15.
19. Supreme Court Act 2003 (NZ), 2003/53, s 3(2); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ),
1990/109, s 4. See also Andrew Geddis, “Parliamentary Government in New Zealand: Lines
of Continuity and Moments of Change” (2016) 14 Int J Constitutional L 99.
20. Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v Attorney-General, [1991] 2 NZLR 323 at 330 (HC);
See also Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, 4th ed
(Brookers, 2014) at 515 (stating “Parliament enjoys unlimited and illimitable powers of
legislation. Parliament’s word can neither be judicially invalidated nor controlled by earlier
enactment. Parliament’s collective will, duly expressed, is law”).
21. Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board, [1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398 (CA), Cooke J. For
consideration on this point, see Sian Elias, “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin
on the Merry-go-Round” (2003) 14 Pub L Rev 148 at 160 [Elias, “Sovereignty”].
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parliamentary competence.22 As I note in Part III, other potential limits have
also been proposed.
The principle operates in different manner in Australia and Canada.23 Unlike
the United Kingdom and Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia and Canada are
federations with codified and entrenched constitutions. The legislative power
of the Commonwealth and Dominion Parliaments are restricted to the heads
of power enumerated in each constitution,24 and the judiciary is empowered to
review legislation passed by the parliament.25 In this sense, neither the Australian
nor the Canadian Parliament can accurately be regarded as possessing the
Diceyean capacity to make any law whatever, and nor is any person or body
prevented from being able to set aside the legislation that their parliament enacts.
Recognizing these limitations, scholars have suggested that “the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty simply does not apply in countries with entrenched
constitutions”26 or perhaps applies “only in a heavily qualified form.”27
However, even if the principle does not have determinative force, the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty functions at a deeper level in both states, conditioning

22. See Matthew SR Palmer, “What is New Zealand’s Constitution and Who Interprets it?
Constitutional Realism and the Importance of Public Office-Holders” (2006) 17 Pub L Rev
133; Sian Elias, “Mapping the Constitutional” (2014) NZLR 1 [Elias, “Mapping”]; Edward
Willis, “Limits on Constitutional Authority” (2014) 22 Waikato L Rev 87; Robin Cooke,
“Fundamentals” (1988) NZLJ 158 at 164.
23. Note that some dispute that the doctrine operates at all in Australia and Canada. See e.g.
David Kinley, “Constitutional Brokerage in Australia: Constitutions and the Doctrines of
Parliamentary Supremacy and the Rule of Law” (1994) 22 Fed L Rev 194 at 195; Peter
Russell, “Standing up for Notwithstanding” (1991) 29 Alta L Rev 293 at 294. For an
excellent distillation of these issues, see Ryan Goss, “What Do Australians Talk About
When They Talk About ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty’?” (Paper delivered at the Public Law
Conference, University of Melbourne, 13 July 2018) [unpublished].
24. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), 63 & 64 Vict, c 12,
s 51 [Australian Constitution]; Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91, 92(10)
[Canadian Constitution].
25. In Australia, the power of constitutional review has been described as “axiomatic.” See
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951), 83 CLR 1 at 262 (HCA), Fullagar J;
Canadian Constitution, supra note 24, s 52(1).
26. Robin Elliot, “Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to
Constitutional Values” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 215 at 236; David E Smith, The Invisible
Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government, revised ed (University of Toronto
Press, 2013) at 35.
27. Goldsworthy, supra note 15 at 1. For discussion as to how Canadian and Australian legal
scholars at the turn of the twentieth century sought to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty
with federalism, see Oliver, supra note 16.
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the relationship between the parliament and the judiciary via a broader faith in
majoritarian politics and representative government.28
In Australia, scholars have acknowledged that parliamentary sovereignty “was
never a feature of Australian constitutional arrangements,”29 but they nonetheless
identify a “culture of parliamentary sovereignty”30 that continues to influence the
operation of public power. In Momcilovic v. The Queen, for example, the High
Court rejected the notion that parliamentary sovereignty applies in Australia,31
but nonetheless adopted a more deferential approach to the interpretation of
human rights acts than courts in the United Kingdom.32 While this outcome
rested in part on textual and constitutional distinctions, the principle retains
purchase in other fields. In “politically sensitive areas,” for instance, scholars have
remarked that the Court’s reluctance to interfere may even “cross the fine line
that separates ‘judicial restraint’ from abdication of judicial responsibility.”33
From time to time, individual Justices of the Court have also emphasized the
enduring significance of parliamentary supremacy in Australia. The doctrine has
been described as “a basic principle of the legal system which has been inherited
in this country from the United Kingdom”34 and as “deeply rooted as any in the
common law.”35 Reflecting its connection to faith in majoritarian politics, Justices
have remarked that the doctrine is consistent with and reinforces “confidence in a
system of parliamentary government with ministerial responsibility,”36 such that

28. See Leslie Zines, Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press,
1991) at 4, cited in Goss, supra note 23. See also Leslie Zines, The High Court and the
Constitution, 5th ed (Federation Press, 2008) at 565-66.
29. Cheryl Saunders, The Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart, 2011) at 76.
30. Ibid at 93. For a similar argument in Canada, see Elliot, supra note 26 at 235-36.
31. See e.g. Momcilovic v the Queen [2011] HCA 34 at paras 156-157, Gummow J.
32. Referring to Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30. For discussion, see Scott
Stephenson, From Dialogue to Disagreement in Comparative Rights Constitutionalism
(Federation Press, 2015) at 206-209.
33. Tony Blackshield, “The High Court’s Implied Rights Experiment” in Matthew Groves,
Janina Boughey & Dan Meagher, eds, The Legal Protection of Rights in Australia (Hart,
2019) 53 at 76 (Referring generally to immigration cases as well as the recent Alley v
Gillespie [2018] HCA 11.
34. Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996), 189 CLR 51 at 74 (HCA),
Dawson J [Kable].
35. Ibid at 76, Dawson J.
36. Attorney-General (Cth) ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 at 24 (HCA),
Barwick CJ. See Australian Constitution, supra note 24, s 64.
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once the judiciary has “ascertained the true scope and effect of valid legislation
[it] should give unquestioned effect to it.”37
Similar support is found in Canada. Patriation of the Canadian Constitution
in 1982 “significantly narrowed the principle of parliamentary sovereignty”38
by imposing limits on the capacity of Parliament to legislate and codifying the
authority of the judiciary to review enactments. While this may have transformed
the Canadian system of government “from a system of parliamentary supremacy
to one of constitutional supremacy,”39 the broader principle “remains foundational
to the structure of the Canadian state.”40 Indeed, as Jean Leclair has noted,
sections 1 and 33 of the Charter “constitute a partial recognition of parliamentary
supremacy,”41 and the Supreme Court of Canada continues to decide cases on the
basis of this principle, suggesting that “some variant of parliamentary sovereignty
continues to subsist in Canadian constitutional law.”42 As the Supreme Court has
recently confirmed, Parliament is supreme over both the executive and judiciary
within its constitutional limits.43

37. Kable, supra note 34 at 590, Dawson J. See also, Kruger v Commonwealth (1997), 190 CLR 1
at 73 (HCA), Dawson J.
38. Patrick Monahan, Byron Shaw & Padraic Ryan, Constitutional Law, 5th ed (Irwin
Law, 2017) at 86.
39. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 72 [Reference re Secession].
40. Reference re PanCanadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 at para 58 [Securities Reference].
See also John Lovell, “Parliamentary Sovereignty in Canada” in Peter Oliver, Patrick
Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution
(Oxford University Press, 2017) at 189.
41. Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27
Queen’s LJ 389 at 420, citing Canada (Auditor General) v Canada (Minister of Energy, Mines
and Resources), [1989] 2 SCR 49 at 91, 103. Dickson CJ wrote:
[I]n the residual area reserved for the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty in Canadian
constitutional law, it is Parliament and the legislatures, not the courts, that have ultimate
constitutional authority to draw the boundaries. It is the prerogative of a sovereign Parliament
to make its intention known as to the role the courts are to play in interpreting, applying and
enforcing its statutes…[t]he grundnorm…[of the Canadian constitution is]…the sovereignty
of Parliament (ibid at 103).

42. Vanessa MacDonnell, “The New Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2016) 21 Rev
Const Stud 13 at 13.
43. Securities Reference, supra note 40 at para 58.
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2.

CAPACITY OF PARLIAMENT TO CONTROL ITS OWN PROCEDURES

It may make little sense to speak of the parliament being supreme “within
limits,”44 but wherever those limits exist, they do not extend to matters internal
to the parliamentary process. A long line of judicial and parliamentary authority,
stretching even beyond the English Bill of Rights 1688,45 protects the capacity
of Parliament to exercise its constitutional functions as a legislature free from
external interference or frustration.46 Following their shared constitutional
foundations, the judiciaries in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand
have each confirmed that courts will refrain from interfering in the internal
affairs of their parliaments.47
Uncertainties do exist: some doubt persists as to whether the principle
reflects jurisdictional or prudential grounds;48 the precise scope of the legislature’s
exclusive authority remains difficult to identify clearly in the abstract; and
some inroads have been made.49 Nonetheless, the general rule remains that
parliaments have exclusive right of control over their own proceedings. Among
other conditions, this means that courts will not intervene to compel a minister
to introduce a bill or require a particular form of consultation be undertaken
before that bill is debated or voted upon.50 As President Cooke of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal explained in Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v.
Attorney-General (Sealords):
Surely in a democracy it would be quite wrong and almost inconceivable for the
Courts to attempt to dictate, by declaration or a willingness to award damages or
any other form of relief, what should be placed before Parliament.…public policy

44. Goss, supra note 23 at 18.
45. 1 Will & Mar, Sess 2, c 2.
46. See e.g. Strode’s Case, 3 Howell’s State Trials 294; Privilege of Parliament Act 1512
(UK), 4 Hen VIII, c 8. For a recent affirmation of this principle, see Miller No 2, supra
note 17 at para 50.
47. For discussion see Osborne v Commonwealth (1911), 12 CLR 321 at 336 (HCA); Canada
(House of Commons) v Vaid, 2005 SCC 30; Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v
Attorney-General, [1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) [Sealords].
48. In Australia, see e.g. Cormack v Cope (1974), 131 CLR 432 (HCA); Victoria v Commonwealth
(1975), 134 CLR 81 (HCA).
49. For instance, the courts are able to adjudicate whether manner and form provisions have
been complied with when enacting legislation. See e.g. Attorney-General (Western Australia) v
Marquet, [2003] HCA 67; R v Mercure, [1981] 1 SCR 234; Shaw v Commissioner of Inland
Revenue, [1999] 3 NZLR 154 (CA).
50. Sealords, supra note 47 at 307-8 (CA).
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requires that the representative chamber of Parliament should be free to determine
what it will or will not allow to be put before it.51

This position reflects the privileges and immunities afforded to the dominion
parliaments, but as President Cooke makes clear, in reinforcing the power
and authority of a democratic majority, it is also an incident of, or shares a
common normative commitment with, parliamentary supremacy.52 Of course,
parliamentary supremacy does not necessarily justify a broad or narrow account
of parliamentary privilege, but the doctrine speaks to the powers and capacity of
a representative institution to carry out its work.53 In essence, while parliament’s
competence may be limited, its authority to develop its own procedures and rules
governing the introduction and debate of proposed legislation—and whether
particular parties are consulted or not—cannot be challenged.
3.

PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY AND THE PEOPLE

The principle of parliamentary supremacy operates to preclude external actors
from placing constraints on the legislature when it is introducing or considering
legislation. This privilege afforded to parliament is consistent with a particular
construction of the institution and of the people it represents. Indeed,
parliamentary supremacy reflects and constructs a specific vision of democracy.
In its democratic ideal, the doctrine presumes homogeneity onto its participants.54
All citizens within the polity are presumed to be members of a “single-status
community,”55 enjoying an undifferentiated right to participate in political
decision making. Consequently, no external actor is entitled to a distinctive or
special access to the peoples’ body. This formally neutral vision of justice serves
the valuable democratic goal of equal citizenship, but it can also “overlook deeply
imbalanced relations of power” between peoples within the state,56 such as between
51. Ibid at 308.
52. Alan Blow, “Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Law unto Itself ” (Speech delivered at a seminar
held by the Australia and New Zealand Association of Clerks-At-The-Table, 22 January
2019) [unpublished].
53. See generally Stuart Larkin, “Parliamentary Privilege, Parliamentary
Sovereignty, and Constitutional Principle” (11 February 2013), online (blog):
UK Constitutional Law Association <ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/02/11/
stuart-lakin-parliamentary-privilege-parliamentary-sovereignty-and-constitutional-principle>.
54. Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political life across the borders of settler states (Duke
University Press, 2014) at 16.
55. Geneviève Nootens, Popular Sovereignty in the West: Polities, Contention, and Ideas
(Routledge, 2013) at 58.
56. Stephen Tierney, “Federalism and the Plurinational Challenge” in Amnon Lev, ed, The
Federal Idea: Public Law Between Governance and Political Life (Hart, 2017) 227 at 235.

Hobbs, Reconciling

Parliamentary Supremacy 349

Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. Incorporating distinct peoples
into a larger, undifferentiated mass of formally equal citizens does not negate the
reality of contestation between different political communities, but it does ensure
that constitutional doctrines and governance institutions are blind to this fact.57
These challenges were largely ignored, and their complexities avoided, in the
development of government structures and institutions in Australia, Canada,
and Aotearoa New Zealand. As Patrick Emerton has explained in relation to
Australia, the democratic and popular frame of government that was imposed
over hundreds of existing political communities was “predicated on the absence of
[ethnic] minorities within the polity.”58 Successive legislative reforms to liberalize
the franchise may have subsequently included Indigenous peoples within the
settler-state polity, but it erased their status as distinct political communities. This
is important because it suggests that parliamentary supremacy, as developed at
Westminster, may be inappropriate in circumstances where a state is comprised of
multiple political communities. In these circumstances, parliamentary supremacy
does not simply countenance but sanctions the capacity of a numerically larger
political community to infringe upon the rights of a numerically smaller political
community. As the New Zealand High Court has remarked, “[i]f content of
legislation offends, the remedies are political and ultimately electoral. The fact
those alternatives seem monumentally difficult, indeed unreal, to particular
persons, or to those espousing unpopular causes, is no more than a dark side
of democracy.”59
The dark side of democracy offers little for those disconnected from the
majority political community. For these three settler states, the nature and history
of colonization mean that “not all individuals and groups have the same ex ante
chance of being in the majority on certain issues.”60 The vision of formally equal
citizens empowered “to shape the social context in which they live”61 by electing
members of parliament, which motivates judicial deference to parliament and
57. For discussion, see Harry Hobbs, “Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and
Multinational Federalism in Australia” (2018) 27 Griffith L Rev 307 at 312.
58. Patrick Emerton, “Ideas” in Cheryl Saunders & Adrienne Stone, eds, The Oxford Handbook
of the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2018) 143 at 156.
59. Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General, [2001] 1 NZLR 40 at para 95 (HC).
60. Paul Patton, “The Limits of Decolonization and the Problem of Legitimacy” in David
Boucher & Ayesha Omar, eds, Decolonisation: Evolution and Revolution (Wits University
Press, forthcoming) at 4, cited in Kirsty Gover, “From the Heart: The Indigenous Challenge
to Australian Public Law” in Jason Varuhas & Shona Wilson Stark, eds, The Frontiers of
Public Law (Hart, 2020) at 210-11.
61. Thomas Pogge, “Creating Supra-National Institutions Democratically: Reflections on the
European Union’s ‘Democratic Deficit’” (1997) 5 J Political Philosophy 179.
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parliamentary processes, omits the situation of Indigenous peoples. To put it
simply, the notion that Indigenous communities participate equally in the
effective control of government “appears at best a hollow ideal.”62
B. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Indigenous peoples are members of settler-state polities. On this basis they are
entitled to vote in regular elections and have their voices heard through the
ordinary means of political participation and electoral accountability. Indigenous
peoples are also members of distinct political communities who continue to
exercise their inherent right to self-determination in myriad ways. The normative
commitment underlying the principle of parliamentary supremacy as it applies in
Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand ignores the existence of multiple
overlapping sites of political authority, potentially clashing with Indigenous
peoples’ collective right to self-determination. Further, as demographic minorities
within the settler state, Indigenous peoples’ right to be involved in law making
that affects their rights and interests may be inhibited by judicial reluctance to
interfere in parliament’s internal affairs.
1.

A COMPLEX TERM

Self-determination has been described as the “river in which all other rights
swim.”63 This is because, at its most basic, self-determination “is the right to
make decisions.”64 The right flows from and is connected to Indigenous peoples’
status as prior self-governing communities who have not ceded their sovereignty.
Palawa lawyer Michael Mansell explains:
Aboriginal sovereignty does exist. Before whites invaded Australia, Aborigines were
the sole and undisputed sovereign authority. The invasion prevented the continuing
exercise of sovereign authority by Aborigines. The invasion and subsequent
occupation has not destroyed the existence of Aboriginal sovereignty.65

62. Patton, supra note 60 at 5.
63. Michael Dodson, Address made at the First Session of the Commission on Human Rights
Working Group (24 November 1995), cited in Craig Scott, “Indigenous Self-Determination
and Decolonisation of the International Imagination: A Plea” (1996) 18 Hum
Rts Q 814 at 814.
64. Austl, Commonwealth, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission: First Report 1993 (Australian Government
Publishing Service, 1993).
65. Michael Mansell, “Finding the Foundation for a Treaty with the Indigenous Peoples of
Australia” (2002) 4 Balayi: Culture, L & Colonialism 83 at 87.

Hobbs, Reconciling

Parliamentary Supremacy 351

The sovereignty that Indigenous people exercised before colonization, at the
time of European settlement, and still retain today, deals with authority at its
most fundamental level. As Mansell explains, sovereignty is “the bedrock on
which Aboriginal rights and entitlements are based”; sovereignty “goes at the
heart of the Aboriginal struggle. It sustains land rights, customary law and
self-determination.”66
As a western concept, “sovereignty” may not be able to capture a complete
understanding of Indigenous epistemologies and perspectives on law, governance,
and culture.67 It is for this reason that Indigenous peoples have sought to
develop an approach to sovereignty “that respects the understanding of power in
indigenous cultures.”68 Indigenous peoples across the world consider sovereignty
to be inherent to their communities. It is a “spiritual notion,”69 a basic power
derived “from within a people or culture,”70 “carried by the body,”71 and located in
the hands of Indigenous people, as individuals and as groups, to determine their
futures. It stems “from the ancient reciprocal relationship we have with our lands.
This relationship finds its roots in our connection to kin and country, manifesting
in our song, dance and story, our language, ceremony and law.”72 In this sense,
sovereignty is an expression of Indigenous peoples’ desire “to continue to exercise
our authority in political, social and legal ways, at least among our own people,
following our own understandings of our (political authority).”73 It reflects

66. Michael Mansell, Treaty and Statehood: Aboriginal Self-Determination (Federation
Press, 2016) at 74.
67. Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed, Sovereignty Matters: Locations of
Contestations and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination (University of
Nebraska Press, 2005) 33 at 33.
68. Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, 2nd ed (Oxford
University Press, 2009) at 78.
69. “The Uluru Statement from the Heart” (2017), online: The Uluru Statement
<ulurustatement.org/the-statement> [Uluru Statement].
70. Kirke Kickingbird et al, “Indian Sovereignty” in John R Wunder, ed, Native American
Sovereignty (Garland Publishing, 1999) 1 at 2.
71. See Aileen Moreton-Robinson, “Introduction” in Aileen Moreton-Robinson, ed, Sovereign
Subjects: Indigenous Sovereignty Matters (Allen & Unwin 2007) 1 at 2.
72. Pekeri Ruska & Callum Clayton-Dixon, “Words of the Struggle” Black Nations
Rising (18 January 2015) at 10, online: <issuu.com/blacknationsrising/docs/
black_nations_rising_issue_1__onlin>.
73. Patricia A Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward, Dreaming Aboriginal People’s Independence
(Fernwood, 1999) at 30.
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Indigenous peoples’ aspirations to “take charge of our own affairs and lead our
own development agendas.”74
Yet sovereignty remains a complex and ambiguous term.75 Despite,
or perhaps because of, its normative power as an “important component of
Indigenous political culture,”76 a wide range of views and attitudes towards and
about sovereignty exist among Indigenous peoples.77 Some Indigenous peoples
use the language of sovereignty to challenge the political authority of the settler
state. Yellowknives Dene political theorist Glen Coulthard, for example, explains
that assertions of Indigenous sovereignty are aimed at fundamentally questioning
“the legitimacy of the settler state’s claim to sovereignty over Indigenous people
and their territories.”78 Tanganekald, Meintangk, and Boandik professor Irene
Watson understands sovereignty in a similar manner. Watson dismisses efforts
to recognize elements of Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination by or
within Australian law as “inevitably reinstat[ing] colonial law”79 and thus leaving
Indigenous peoples “subservient to the rules of the state.”80
Not all Indigenous peoples and communities use the language of sovereignty
in this way. Māori professor Roger Maaka and non-Indigenous Canadian academic
Augie Fleras have noted that “Indigenous claims to sovereignty rarely entail
separation or secession but instead a reconstitutionalising of the first principles
upon which Indigenous peoples-state relations are governed.”81 Eualeyai and
Kamillaroi scholar Larissa Behrendt explains that sovereignty in this sense is:
74. Noel Pearson, “In Pursuit of Regional, Reciprocal Responsibility Settlement for Cape York:
What is Right Package of Reforms for Indigenous Social, Political, Economic and Cultural
Development” (Speech delivered at the National Native Title Conference, Port Douglas,
18 June 2015) [unpublished].
75. For a larger exploration of Indigenous peoples’ political aspirations through the language of
sovereignty, see Harry Hobbs, Indigenous Aspirations and Structural Reform in Australia (Hart,
2021) at 57-75 [Hobbs, Indigenous Aspirations].
76. Sarah Maddison, Black Politics: Inside the Complexity of Aboriginal Political Culture (Allen &
Unwin, 2009) at 49.
77. See Bidtah Nellie Becker, “Sovereignty from the Individual Diné Perspective” in Lloyd Lee,
ed, Navajo Sovereignty: Understandings and Visions of the Diné People (University of Arizona
Press, 2017) 43 at 43.
78. Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition
(University of Minnesota Press, 2014) at 36.
79. Irene Watson, Aboriginal Peoples, Colonialism and International Law: Raw Law
(Routledge, 2015) at 2.
80. Ibid at 91.
81. Roger Maaka & Augie Fleras, “Engaging with Indigeneity: Tino Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa”
in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton & Will Sanders, eds, Political Theory and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 89 at 89.
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a device by which other rights can be achieved. Rather than being the aim of political
advocacy, it is a starting point for recognition of rights and inclusion in democratic
processes. It is seen as a footing, a recognition, from which to demand those rights
and transference of power from the Australian state, not a footing from which to
separate from it.82

On this account:
[s]overeignty can be demonstrated as Aboriginal people controlling all aspects of
their lives and destiny. Sovereignty is independent action. It is Aborigines doing
things as Aboriginal people, controlling those aspects of our existence which
are Aboriginal. These include our culture, our economy, our social lives and our
indigenous political institutions.83

At root in many, though not all, of these calls is not secession but autonomy:
a desire to “get greater control over our lives and future.”84 This approach is
consistent with the modern treaties signed between First Nations and the
Canadian Crown. First Nations engaged in these processes perceive them as
mechanisms to become “full and equal participants of Canadian society”85 while
maintaining a domain of separate jurisdiction.
This understanding of sovereignty is also reflected in the UNDRIP. Article 3
of the Declaration provides that Indigenous peoples may “freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
This broad entitlement is particularized in Articles 4 and 5, which guarantee
Indigenous peoples the “right to autonomy or self-government” in relation to
“internal and local affairs” as well as the right to maintain their distinct political,
legal, economic, social, and cultural institutions. Consistent with this right,
Indigenous peoples are entitled to “belong to an indigenous community or
nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or
nation concerned”86 as well as the right to maintain and manifest their traditions,
languages, customs, histories, and cultures.87 Indigenous peoples are also entitled
82. Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia’s Future (Federation
Press, 2003) at 99.
83. National Aboriginal Island Health Organisation (NAIHO Collective), “Sovereignty” (1983),
online: <www.kooriweb.org/foley/resources/story8.html>, cited in ibid at 100.
84. Lars-Anders Baer, “The Right of Self-Determination and the Case of the Sámi” in Pekka Aiko
& Martin Scheinin, eds, Operationalizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination
(Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2000) 223 at 230.
85. Edward Allen, “Our Treaty, Our Inherent Right to Self-Government: An Overview of the
Nisga’a Final Agreement” (2004) 11 Intl J Minority & Group Rights 233 at 234.
86. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art 9.
87. Ibid, arts 11-16.
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to participate within the state. Article 5 provides a broad guarantee that Indigenous
peoples have the right to “participate fully…in the political, economic, social and
cultural life of the State.” Consequently, Indigenous peoples are entitled to a
nationality88 as well to participate in any state process that may affect their rights
“in accordance with their own procedures” and “decision-making institutions.”89
In other words, the Declaration entitles Indigenous peoples both to participate
in the political life of the state and to “preserve and develop their own distinct
societies, to exist side-by-side with the majority society.”90
2.

POTENTIAL CLASHES

Two potential clashes can immediately be noted. First, Indigenous peoples’ status
as members of overlapping political communities challenges the conception
of the people constructed by parliamentary supremacy. If a state is comprised
of multiple political communities, it may not be appropriate for law making
to be undertaken in conditions where one political community constitutes an
overwhelming demographic majority. In these circumstances, the ability of
numerically smaller political communities to have their interests heard in the
law-making process will be severely constrained. Alternative arrangements may
need to be devised.
Second, Indigenous peoples’ status as sovereign political communities gives
rise to a right to be involved in law-making processes. This includes both a right
to self-government and a right to shared-government. A right to self-government
appears to conflict directly with the principle of parliamentary supremacy. While
we have seen that the doctrine itself is subject to differing applications, in its
orthodox articulation parliamentary supremacy holds that there is an ultimate
law-making authority. Recognizing a separate domain of jurisdiction, within
which the state parliament has no authority, poses a challenge to this account.
Nonetheless, this conflict can be reconciled relatively simply by adapting federal
principles. Treaties or agreements struck between the state and Indigenous
communities could recognize a domain of Indigenous jurisdiction that is inherent
to that community and within which state law has no application. If constructed
equitably, this arrangement could challenge the monolegalism inherent within
accounts of parliamentary supremacy and capture the vitality and force of

88. Ibid, art 6.
89. Ibid, arts 18-19.
90. Matthias Åhrén, Indigenous Peoples Status in the International Legal System (Oxford University
Press, 2016) at 132. See also ch 5 (ibid).

Hobbs, Reconciling

Parliamentary Supremacy 355

Indigenous legal orders.91 This account may be idealistic, but the fact that it can
be squared with parliamentary supremacy in a somewhat straightforward manner
means that it does not form the focus of this article.
The right to participate within the state indicates that self-determination
also encompasses a right of shared rule. While it is appropriate for Indigenous
peoples to exercise jurisdiction over matters that solely affect their interests, issues
that affect both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples should be determined
in consultation.92 The UNDRIP itself does not outline a precise standard, instead
indicating that states should undertake “effective consultation”93 or “consul[t]
and cooperat[e]”94 with Indigenous peoples, leaving an appropriate norm
to develop over time. In recent years, United Nations bodies examining the
extant practice have outlined several key points. These bodies have found that
consultation should be undertaken at an early stage of any process, in good faith,
through culturally appropriate procedures, with representatives freely chosen
by Indigenous peoples within their own representative structures. There should
be “no coercion, intimidation or manipulation,” and there must be sufficient
time and information.95 As they have made clear, consultation as an element
of self-determination is not a “mere right to be involved” or simply to be heard
but a right “to influence the outcome,” including by proposing alternative and
distinct models to those offered by government or other actors,96 as well as the
“freedom to guide and direct the process of consultation.”97 Importantly, there
must be “a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent” mechanism to
facilitate consultation and alleviate power imbalances.98 Even if consent is not
required, meaningful and genuine consultation is a clear element of Indigenous
self-determination and it must be undertaken.

91. Claire Charters, “Recognition of Tikanaga Māori and the Constitutional Myth of
Monolegalism: Reinterpreting Case Law” (15 January 2019) at 5, online: <papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3316400>.
92. Åhrén, supra note 90 at 138-43; Hobbs, supra note 57 at 321-24.
93. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art 30(2).
94. Ibid, arts 15(2), 17(2), 19, 32(2), 36(2), 38.
95. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies
regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples, UNESCOR, 2005, Supp
No 23, UN Doc E/C.19/2005/3, at 12.
96. Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Free, Prior and Informed Consent:
A Human-Rights Based Approach, UNGAOR, 73rd Sess, Supp No 53 A, UN Doc A/
HRC/39/62, at 5 [Expert Mechanism].
97. Ibid at 6.
98. UNDRIP, supra note 6, art 27.
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The precise institutional arrangement to meet this standard can take diverse
forms. As we will see below, Canada and Aotearoa New Zealand have developed
fiduciary-like principles that require the government to consult with Indigenous
peoples.99 However, it is not clear that this is sufficient because, as Article 19
of the UNDRIP makes clear, Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination
encompasses the right to influence the development and drafting of legislation.
This right potentially conflicts with the principle of parliamentary supremacy in
these settler states by challenging the legislatures’ authority to control their own
procedures. Is this right recognized in the domestic law of Australia, Canada,
or Aotearoa New Zealand? If not specifically protected, how do the courts
mediate this apparent conflict? Does the principle of parliamentary supremacy
displace Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination? If so, should
it? In the following Part, I explore how courts in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa
New Zealand have answered these questions.

II. THREE CASE STUDIES
A. AUSTRALIA

In 2008, Joan Maloney was charged with possessing two bottles of liquor in a
public place without a permit, contrary to several provisions of a Queensland
law. Maloney was an Aboriginal woman from the overwhelmingly Indigenous
Bwgcolman community (Palm Island). At this time, Bwgcolman was one of only
eighteen places in Queensland declared a restricted area—every one of which was
located in an Indigenous community.100 Maloney did not contest the facts. Instead,
she argued that the relevant provisions of the Liquor Act 1992 (Queensland) were
inconsistent with a federal law prohibiting racial discrimination and therefore
invalid by operation of section 109 of the Australian Constitution.101 A majority
of the High Court accepted that the impugned provisions discriminated against
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The question became whether
they could be characterized as a special measure under section 8 of the Racial

99. Kirsty Gover, “The Honour of the Crowns: State-Indigenous Fiduciary Relationships and
Australian Exceptionalism” (2016) 38 Sydney L Rev 339. See also Parts II(B), II(C), below.
100. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 202, Bell J.
101. In the event of conflict between federal and state laws, section 109 of the Australian
Constitution renders state laws invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. See Australian
Constitution, supra note 24, s 109.
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Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA);102 if so, the provisions would not
be inconsistent.
At issue in Maloney was the intersection of parliamentary supremacy and
Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination. Maloney and the
National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples argued that consent is an integral
element of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.103 Although the views
of the community had been sought, they argued that the process was insufficient.
The state demurred. There was no obligation on the text to undertake consultation
or obtain consent. Whether the provisions were necessary was “principally a
matter for the Parliament to assess,” and the responsible Minister was ultimately
“accountable to Parliament” for their decision.104 These two competing principles
underlay the decision, but the resolution of Maloney ultimately turned on the
particular legal framework. It is to that framework we now turn before exploring
the decision in detail.
The Australian Constitution divides responsibilities between the several
states and the federal government. Legislative authority over Indigenous affairs is
shared; state and federal parliaments enjoy concurrent plenary legislative power
in this area.105 Limited fetter on that authority exists. Alone among common law
states, Australia does not possess a national human rights act or constitutional
bill of rights.106 Similarly, unlike Canada or Aotearoa New Zealand, no treaty
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the Crown was signed
at first contact or in the years following settlement.107
In the absence of a foundational treaty relationship or constitutional rights
protection, there are limited opportunities for courts to protect and promote
Indigenous peoples’ interests. Commonwealth involvement in Indigenous
affairs is primarily exercised through sections 51(xxvi) and 122 of the Australian
Constitution. Section 51(xxvi) empowers the federal Parliament with the authority
102. This provision transposes Article 1(4) of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. See International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195, art 1(4) (entered into
force 4 January 1969).
103. See Maloney v The Queen, [2013] HCA 28 (Submission of the Appellant at paras 53-61)
[Appellant’s Submissions]; Maloney v The Queen, [2013] HCA 28 (Submission of the National
Congress of Australia’s First Peoples at para 26); Expert Mechanism, supra note 96 at 6.
104. Maloney v The Queen, [2013] HCA 28 (Submission of the Respondent at para 63).
105. Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988), 82 ALR 43 (HC).
106. George Williams & Daniel Reynolds, A Charter of Rights for Australia, 4th ed (University of
New South Wales Press, 2017) at 17.
107. Harry Hobbs & George Williams, “The Noongar Settlement: Australia’s First Treaty” (2018)
40 Sydney L Rev 1 at 22-23.

358

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

to make laws with respect to “the people of any race.” The High Court has never
definitively ruled on the scope of the race power, but the orthodox position is
that the broadly framed provision permits the Parliament to enact legislation that
imposes a disadvantage on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.108 The
situation is similar for section 122. That provision authorizes the Parliament to
“make laws for the government of any territory,” thus empowering federal action
in the Northern Territory. Few express or implied limitations on the scope of the
territories power have been found.109
Some statutory rights protections do exist. The RDA prohibits acts or legislation
that discriminate on the basis of race, except where such discrimination is a
“special measure” designed to secure the advancement of members of a particular
race.110 Its protections are narrow. As ordinary Commonwealth legislation, the
RDA is not entrenched against the Commonwealth, and the federal Parliament
has passed at least three laws that override or exclude its protections over the last
two decades.111 In each case, that legislation has expressly discriminated against
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. Nonetheless, the RDA does apply
to state legislation and it has been effective in protecting Indigenous peoples by
rendering discriminatory legislation in Queensland112 and Western Australia113
inoperative. In Maloney, the High Court was asked to make a similar finding.
Critical to the determination was the issue of consultation. Article 1(4) of
the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and section 8
of the RDA do not expressly require consultation with an affected ethnic or racial
community.114 Maloney contended, however, that “considerable developments
108. Robert French, “The Race Power: A Constitutional Chimera” in HP Lee & George
Winterton, eds, Australian Constitutional Landmarks (Cambridge University Press,
2003) 180 at 206. See Western Australia v Commonwealth, [1995] HCA 47; Kartinyeri v
Commonwealth, [1998] HCA 22.
109. See generally Berwick Ltd v Gray, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1976) 133 CLR 603 at
607 (HCA), Mason J; New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia, [2006] HCA 52 at
paras 328-45, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon & Crennan JJ; Newcrest Mining (WA)
Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 at 604-605 (HCA), Gummow J.
110. Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), 1975/52, ss 8, 9; Gerhardy v Brown (1985), 159
CLR 70 [Gerhardy].
111. Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), 1993/110, Part 2, Division 2; Native Title Amendment Act 1998
(Cth), 1998/97, Schedule 1, s 3; Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007
(Cth), 2007/129, Part 4.
112. Mabo v Queensland (No 1) (1988), 166 CLR 186 (HCA).
113. Western Australia v Commonwealth [1995] HCA 47.
114. For suggestions as to why this is the case, see Rachel Gear, “Commentary: Alcohol
Restrictions and Indigenous Australians: The Social and Policy Implications of Maloney v
The Queen” (2014) 21 James Cook U L Rev 41 at 49.
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in international jurisprudence and international standard-setting” evidenced
an evolved position at international law relevant for the construction of the
RDA.115 Certainly, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(“CERD Committee”), an independent expert body tasked with monitoring the
implementation of the CERD, has twice confirmed that consultation is required.
In General Recommendation 23, the CERD Committee called on states to ensure
that “no decisions directly relating to [Indigenous peoples’] rights and interests are
taken without their informed consent.”116 Similarly, in General Recommendation
32, the CERD Committee concluded that special measures must be “designed and
implemented on the basis of prior consultation with affected communities and
the active participation of such communities.”117 These statements are fortified
by the development of Indigenous-specific rights instruments articulated above,
including Article 19 of the UNDRIP and the thematic advice provided by the
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The High Court rejected the relevance of these instruments. For five of
the six Justices, the question was a simple exercise of statutory interpretation.
Although “as a matter of common sense,” consultation “is likely to be essential
to the practical implementation”118 of any measure, neither the text of the RDA
nor the CERD expressly required Parliament to consult the community whose
interests are intended to be advanced. Consequently, consultation was held not
to be a legal requirement.119 The provision was declared valid, and Maloney’s
conviction was upheld.
In disclaiming or downplaying the relevance of extrinsic international
legal materials in interpreting Australia’s treaty obligations,120 several justices
revealed that concerns over parliamentary supremacy motivated their reasoning.
For instance, while Chief Justice French considered that the output of treaty
115. Appellant’s Submissions, supra note 103 at para 53. Maloney also drew on comments in
Gerhardy. See Gerhardy, supra note 110 at 28, Brennan J.
116. Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UNGAOR, 52nd Sess,
Supp No 18, UN Doc A/52/18 (1997) at 122.
117. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General recommendation No 32: The
meaning and scope of special measures in the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms Racial Discrimination, 75th Sess, UN Doc CERD/C/GC/32 (2009) at para 18.
118. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 25, French CJ.
119. Ibid at paras 24, 91, 131, 176, 240. Justice Gageler reached the same conclusion but on
different grounds, holding instead that international law does not impose “a priori procedural
constraint” on special measures. See ibid at para 357.
120. For criticism on this aspect, see Patrick Wall, “The High Court of Australia’s Approach to the
Interpretation of International Law and its Use of International Legal Materials in Maloney v
The Queen [2013] HCA 28”, Case Comment, (2014) 15 Melbourne J Intl L 1.

360

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

bodies like the CERD Committee “may illuminate the interpretation of [a]
provision,” it “does not mean that Australian courts can adopt ‘interpretations’
which rewrite the incorporated text.”121 Justice Kiefel held similarly, noting
that courts can rely on extrinsic materials to aid interpretation only where they
“can be accommodated in the process of construing the domestic statute” and
have been agreed to by Australia.122 Other members of the Court were even less
accommodating. Justice Hayne held that only material that “existed at the time
the [RDA] was enacted” would be relevant,123 and Justice Crennan denied any
role to such material. To do otherwise would “elevate non-binding extraneous
materials over the language of the text of an international convention to which
States Parties have agreed.”124 As Justice Bell warned, the ordinary meaning of the
statute “cannot be supplemented by additional [non-binding] criteria.”125
The case confirms that, absent statutory amendment, there is no requirement
in Australian law that legislation designed to secure the advancement of
Indigenous peoples either has their support or has been drafted in accordance
with their wishes. However, some members of the Court were careful to note
that the absence of a genuine consultative process may still be relevant in certain
circumstances, leaving open the prospect that inadequate consultation could lead
to a provision’s invalidation. This is because, Chief Justice French and Justice Bell
explained, to satisfy the requirements of a special measure, a law must be “capable
of being reasonably considered to be appropriate and adapted to achieving” its
purpose.126 While the Justices noted that it is not appropriate for the judiciary to
“determine whether the provisions are the appropriate ones to achieve, or whether
they will in fact achieve, the particular purpose,”127 a “court can determine
whether the political branch acted reasonably in making [its] assessment.”128
Whether any consultation actually took place is an evidentiary point relevant
for that determination. In the absence of any genuine consultation, “it may be
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Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 23.
Ibid at para 175.
Ibid at para 61.
Ibid at para 134.
Ibid at para 235.
Ibid at para 20, citing Gerhardy, supra note 110 at 149, Deane J. See also Maloney HCA,
supra note 1 at para 246.
127. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 20, citing Gerhardy, supra note 110 at 139, Brennan J
[emphasis in original].
128. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 20, French CJ. See also ibid at para 246, Bell J.
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open to a court to conclude that the measure is not reasonably capable of being
appropriate and adapted for the sole purpose it purports to serve.”129
This reasoning leaves the door to meaningful consultation ajar. Litigants
seeking to prise the door open a little further would be advised to build a
comprehensive record demonstrating the inadequacy of any consultation.130
However, any opening may be narrower than it initially appears. Concern over
the appropriate role of the judiciary in monitoring Parliament is a feature of the
test, but its exercise also reveals that courts may be reluctant to interrogate the
extent of consultation in practice or challenge government assertions, particularly
where competing evidence is light. The Explanatory Notes to the regulation
declaring Bwgcolman a restricted area record that an alcohol management plan
was desired by the community, but that the plan ultimately adopted “differ[s]
from the recommendations” of the community’s representatives.131 It notes
sparingly that “ongoing division…inhibited community agreement,” compelling
the government to draft “a compromise.”132 The source or intensity of that
division is not explored.133 In response, Maloney tendered fourteen affidavits
from senior members of the community, alleging that “there was no or no real or
effective consultation.”134 At the District Court, Chief Judge Durward accepted
these statements as opinion genuinely held by the deponents but considered
them insufficient for determining an issue as broad as community consultation.135
In light of the Explanatory Notes, Chief Judge Durward held that it was open to
infer that consultation had occurred.136 The Court of Appeal and the High Court
accepted this position with little discussion.137
The strength of Maloney’s affidavits may have been limited when assessing
consultation with a community of some two thousand people, but the approach
of the Court of Appeal and High Court leaves much to be desired. As Kirsty
Gover has argued, this issue was discussed “in only the most rudimentary terms
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Ibid at para 25, French CJ. See also ibid at paras 91, 246.
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Explanatory Notes, Liquor Amendment Regulation (No 4) 2006 (Qld), 2006/79, at para 9.
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Though see R v Maloney, [2012] QCA 105 at para 46, McMurdo P [Maloney QCA].
Maloney v Queensland Police Service, [2011] QDC 139 at para 38.
Ibid at paras 43-44.
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Maloney QCA, supra note 133 at paras 107-12, Chesterman JA & Daubney J; Maloney
HCA, supra note 1 at paras 25, 319.
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and with a strong emphasis on the reports provided by government officials.”138
If this approach is adopted in future cases the opportunity for meaningful review
will be limited. This is especially so if the onus remains on the appellant to
demonstrate that genuine consultation was not undertaken.
The decision in Maloney is problematic for another reason. Fundamentally,
it misses the key point that makes Indigenous people vulnerable in this case.
This is most clearly identifiable in Justice Crennan’s judgment. She notes that
“ordinarily neither consultation with constituents nor their consent to a law is
a precondition to the legality of a statute.”139 This is because robust “democratic
mechanisms” such as a “free, informed public debate, a free press and regular
elections,” through “which representative governments resolve contested policy,”
permit the electorate to issue their judgment at the end of a parliamentary
term.140 This is an accurate description of Australia’s system of government,
but it entirely ignores the distinctive position of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples. As Indigenous peoples are a marginalized, extreme numerical
minority, territorially dispersed across the country, the absence of a requirement
of consultation, even when implementing coercive measures supposedly targeted
at improving Indigenous peoples’ lives, inhibits their capacity to contest and
challenge government action. Judicial approaches that prioritize anxieties over
parliamentary supremacy further diminish or erode what little opportunities
exist for Indigenous peoples to be heard and have their interests considered in the
development of legislation. This is problematic in and of itself, but it is especially
challenging in a situation where the state has acknowledged that Indigenous
peoples have a right to self-determination.
B. CANADA

The constitutional framework that underpins Canada’s relationship with First
Nations is materially distinct from that of Australia, but similar questions
governing the clash of parliamentary supremacy and Indigenous peoples’ right to
self-determination have arisen. In Mikisew Cree, the Supreme Court of Canada
confronted this issue. In 2012, the federal Minister of Finance introduced two
138. “Indigenous-State Relationships and the Paradoxical Effects of Antidiscrimination Law:
Lessons from the Australian High Court in Maloney v The Queen” in Jennifer Hendry et al,
eds, Indigenous Justice: New Tools, Approaches, and Spaces (Palgrave, 2018) 27 at 43. See also
Maureen Tehan, “Practising Law and Politics in 1980s’ Australia: The Liberating Effect of
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen” (2014) 23 Griffith L Rev 92 at 106.
139. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 135, Crennan J.
140. Ibid.
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omnibus bills that would substantially reshape Canada’s environmental protection
regime.141 Intended to allow Canada “to capitalize on its resource development
potential,”142 the bills proposed to facilitate the growth of extractive industries.
Among other elements, industry would be permitted to build structures on or near
waterways without requiring government approval, and protection mechanisms
for fish and wildlife would be removed. The bills had the potential to adversely
affect the Mikisew Cree First Nation’s constitutionally protected treaty rights to
hunt, trap, and fish. As the First Nation was not consulted at any stage in their
development or prior to the granting of royal assent, the Mikisew Cree sought a
declaration that the state owed and breached its duty to consult.
In Canada, the relationship between First Nations and the state is governed
by a foundational “constitutional principle”143 described as the honour of the
Crown. This public fiduciary-like obligation is derived “from the Crown’s
assumption of sovereignty over lands and resources formerly held” by sovereign
First Nations144 and is a mechanism that aims at facilitating reconciliation between
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.145 The principle “gives rise to different duties
in different circumstances.”146 Where, for instance, the Crown has “assumed
discretionary control over specific Aboriginal interests,” such as reserve lands,
a fiduciary duty to act in the Aboriginal group’s best interests arises.147 In Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the Supreme Court confirmed
that “[t]he honour of the Crown also infuses the processes of treaty making and
treaty interpretation.”148 As “[i]t is always assumed that the Crown intends to
fulfil its promises,”149 the honour of the Crown requires any ambiguity to be
141. The bills received royal assent in June and December 2012. See Jobs, Growth and Long-term
Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19; Jobs and Growth Act, SC 2012, c 31.
142. “Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on
March 29, 2012 and other measures,” 2nd reading, House of Commons Debates, 41-1, No 115
(2 May 2012) at 7470 (Hon Joe Oliver).
143. Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 42.
144. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 53
[Haida Nation].
145. Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 66,
McLachlin CJC & Karakatsanis J; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the
Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR 433 at 436.
146. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 18. See also Chris W Sanderson, Keith B Bergner
& Michelle S Jones, “The Crown’s Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples: Towards an
Understanding of the Source, Purpose, and Limits of the Duty” (2012) 49 Alta L
Rev 821 at 824.
147. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 18. See e.g. Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 335.
148. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 19.
149. R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41, Cory J.
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“resolved in favour of the Indians” and that treaties generally are “interpreted in
a manner that maintains the integrity of the Crown.”150
Fundamentally, the principle requires that the Crown act honourably
“[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples.”151 For this reason, it also applies
in circumstances where First Nations’ rights have not been proven or settled by
treaty. In these cases, the honour of the Crown gives rise to a duty to consult with
and accommodate the interests of First Nations when contemplating conduct that
might adversely affect potential or established Aboriginal or treaty rights.152 Here,
the duty to consult serves two purposes. First, it is an element to be considered
when assessing whether Crown conduct has justifiably infringed asserted
Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 of the Constitution.153 Second, more
broadly, as “a corollary of the Crown’s obligation to achieve the just settlement of
Aboriginal claims through the treaty process,”154 it is intended “to reconcile prior
Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown sovereignty.”155
The extent or scope of consultation required to satisfy the duty differs in
accordance with the strength of the claim and the significance of the potential
infringement.156 Owing to its source, however, in all cases consultation “must be
consistent with the honour of the Crown”;157 that is, it “must be meaningful and
performed in good faith, with the intention of substantially addressing the concerns
of the affected Indigenous group.”158 Meaningful consultation may require “the
Crown to make changes to its proposed action based on information obtained
through consultations.”159 Although it is not possible to determine in advance
the steps that must be taken, the Crown should take the interests and concerns

150. Ibid at para 9, Sopinka J.
151. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 17.
152. R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow]; Haida Nation, supra note 144 at paras
16-25; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC
69 [Canadian Heritage]. See generally Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult
Aboriginal Peoples (Purich Publishing, 2014).
153. Sparrow, supra note 152.
154. Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 32 [Rio Tinto].
155. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 26.
156. Ibid at para 44.
157. Ibid at para 38.
158. Sarah Morales, “Braiding the Incommensurable: Indigenous Legal Traditions and the Duty
to Consult” in Jennifer Goyder et al, eds, UNDRIP Implementation: Braiding International,
Domestic and Indigenous Laws, Special Report (Centre for International Governance
Innovation, 2017) 63 at 66. See also Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia
(Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74 at para 29.
159. Haida Nation, supra note 144 at para 46.
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voiced by the affected Indigenous group seriously, by “substantially addressing”160
them and, “wherever possible,” ensuring that they are “demonstrably integrated
into the proposed plan of action.”161
The Mikisew Cree were not consulted, and their interests were consequently
not addressed nor integrated into the development of the two omnibus bills.
However, it was not clear whether the duty to consult applies to the development
of policy in furtherance of the formulation and introduction of a bill. Could the
Mikisew Cree successfully challenge the introduction of a bill on the basis of
insufficient consultation? While the Supreme Court had previously demurred
on this question,162 several lower courts had considered it and reached different
conclusions.163 How would the Supreme Court respond?
The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal on procedural grounds.164
Nevertheless, as the parties “made extensive submissions on the substantive issues
in [the] appeal,”165 all members of the Court considered the larger question.166
A five to four majority confirmed that the honour of the Crown applies to
Parliament. By seven to two, however, another majority rejected the proposition
that the duty to consult applies to the law-making process. This latter majority
was delivered in three separate judgments. Central to each was an overriding
concern that extending the duty to consult to the law-making process would
impermissibly interfere with parliamentary supremacy and infringe the separation
of powers. Both principled and practical concerns were raised.
Consider first the Court’s discussion on the separation of powers. While
acknowledging that this principle “is not a rigid and absolute structure,”167 the
160. Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 168; Canadian Heritage, supra
note 152 at paras 61-62.
161. Halfway River First Nation v BC, 1999 BCCA 470 at para 160.
162. Rio Tinto, supra note 154 at para 44.
163. For judicial decisions that upheld the applicability of the duty to consult once a bill has been
introduced into the legislature, see Courtoreille v Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development), 2014 FC 1244; Ross River Dena Council v Government of Yukon, 2012 YKCA
14 at para 39. For examples where courts answered this question in the negative, see R v
Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206 at para 38; Canada (Governor General in Council) v Mikisew Cree
First Nation, 2016 FCA 311 at para 60, de Montigny & Webb JJA [Courtoreille 2016].
164. Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at paras 16-18, 54, 101, 148. Here, the Court held unanimously
that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Mikisew Cree’s application for
judicial review.
165. Ibid at para 19, Wagner CJC, Karakatsanis & Gascon JJ.
166. For an illuminating exploration of the four judgments, see Nichols &
Hamilton, supra note 8.
167. Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at para 119, Brown J, citing Wells v Newfoundland, [1999] 3 SCR
199 at para 54.
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majority judgments contended that its maintenance protects the process of
legislative policy development and allows the legislature to fulfill its constitutional
role. Consequently, courts should “exercise restraint”168 lest they “trespass onto the
legislature’s domain”169 and “step beyond the core of [their] institutional role.”170
This view is fortified by pragmatic considerations. As law making “is a highly
complex process involving multiple actors across government,”171 imposing a duty
to consult would constrain “legislatures’ ability to control their own processes”172
and “grind the day-to-day internal operation of government to a halt.”173
The majority judgments also understood the challenge as a threat to
parliamentary supremacy. Imposing an obligation or restraint on the introduction
of legislation was regarded as “a fetter on the sovereignty of Parliament itself,”174
with the potential to “undermine its ability to act as the voice of the electorate.”175
This unease was most forcefully given voice by Justice Brown. In language
reminiscent of Justice Crennan in Maloney, Justice Brown emphatically held
that “[l]egislators are not bound to consult with affected parties before passing
legislation,”176 as “the only procedure due any citizen of Canada is that proposed
legislation receive three readings in the Senate and House of Commons and
that it receive Royal Assent.”177 While the surrounding legal context is distinct
and First Nations in Canada have alternate means to contest and challenge state
conduct—a point critical to the majority’s forceful dismissal of the Mikisew Cree
claim—the consequences of this approach remain concerning. As in Australia,
it magnifies the specific disadvantages First Nations face in ensuring that
their interests are considered in the design and formation of legislative policy
development. While “it is open to First Nations…to lobby government officials
and members of Parliament,”178 as numerical minorities within the Canadian
168.
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para 92, Pelletier JA.
Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at para 122, Brown J, citing Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan
(BC), [1991] 2 SCR 525 at 560.
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state they will struggle to have their voices heard if their distinct status is erased
and they are conceived as simply part of an undifferentiated mass of formally
equal Canadian citizens.
A key factor in the majority decisions dismissing the appeal was the existence
of alternative avenues for First Nations to seek vindication for their rights. Rather
than interfere in the law-making process, the majority judgments considered
that the Mikisew Cree could more appropriately challenge the adequacy of any
consultation following enactment.179 Crown conduct that purportedly infringes
Aboriginal or treaty rights may be challenged under the test set out in R v.
Sparrow.180 Under this test, whether any consultation was undertaken, and its
adequacy, is a factor considered by the courts in assessing whether infringement is
justified. However, while Sparrow has been effective in some cases, its framing is
not beyond criticism. Its broad formulation may allow constitutionally protected
rights to “be overridden on broad policy grounds,”181 while its analytical emphasis
rests on justifying limitations.182 The test is also retrospective, aimed at assessing
whether Crown conduct that has already occurred can be justified because of prior
consultation. As Justices Abella and Martin explained, “[o]ngoing consultation is
preferable” as it protects First Nations’ “rights from irreversible harm.”183
In dissent on this point, Justices Abella and Martin struck a different
approach. They understood the duty to consult in a holistic sense. “Because
the honour of the Crown infuses the entirety of the government’s relationship
with Indigenous peoples”184 and is intended to facilitate “the reconciliation of
pre-existing Indigenous societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty,”185 the
obligation to consult should arise “based on the effect, not the source, of the
government action.”186 While parliamentary supremacy and the separation of
powers “are central to ensuring that the legislative branch of government is able
to do its work without undue interference,” they “cannot displace the honour
179. Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at paras 52, 145, 154.
180. Sparrow, supra note 152; Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at paras 77-78.
181. Kent McNeil, “How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples
be Justified?” (1996) 8 Const Forum Const 33 at 39. See also R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR
533 at para 6; John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v British
Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius:
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 701 at 740.
182. Richard Stacey, “Honour in Sovereignty: Can Crown Consultation with Indigenous Peoples
Erase Canada’s Sovereignty Deficit?” (2018) 68 UTLJ 405 at 420.
183. Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at para 78, Abella & Martin JJ.
184. Ibid at para 63, Abella & Martin JJ.
185. Ibid at para 58, Abella & Martin JJ.
186. Ibid at para 55, Abella & Martin JJ.
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of the Crown.”187 After all, “[t]he duty to consult is not a suggestion to consult,
it is a duty, just as the honour of the Crown is not a mere ‘incantation’ or
aspirational goal.”188
If the honour of the Crown “is not only a constitutional imperative” but
a limitation on “Crown sovereignty itself,” then a strict approach to judicial
intervention in the legislative process is not appropriate in issues relating to First
Nations.189 Concerns relating to the separation of powers and parliamentary
supremacy, while valid, are thus of less force. Indeed, section 35 of the Canadian
Constitution clarifies that First Nations peoples are not simply undifferentiated
citizens, but that they are entitled to specific rights and it is the constitutional
responsibility of the judiciary to protect and vindicate those rights.190 While the
mechanics of consultation can be modified to consider the specific challenges of
law making, there is no principled reason why the duty itself should not extend
to the legislative process.191 The question is how a framework can facilitate the
fulfillment of that duty.
C. AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

The relationship between Māori and the state in Aotearoa New Zealand is
mediated by the Treaty of Waitangi.192 Under the Treaty, Māori signatories ceded
kawanatanga (governorship) to the British Crown, while being promised that
their tino rangatiratanga (full authority) over their land, people, and treasure
would remain undisturbed. However, for many years the Treaty was simply
ignored, and the Crown alienated Māori land without considering their interests
or providing compensation. In 1877, this approach reached its zenith, when in
Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington, Chief Justice Prendergast dismissed the Treaty
as a “simple nullity.”193
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Responding to increasing public pressure, in 1975 the government established
a tribunal to investigate alleged breaches of the Treaty.194 Initially, the Waitangi
Tribunal was empowered to investigate alleged breaches by the government
or any state-controlled body occurring after 1975. The Tribunal could make
recommendations about how to redress those breaches,195 but it did not have
legal authority to enforce remedies. In 1985, the Treaty of Waitangi Act (New
Zealand) was amended to provide the Tribunal with retrospective jurisdiction
dating from 1840,196 though its enforcement powers were not strengthened.
Instead, Crown and iwi have engaged in settlement processes to address and
rectify alleged breaches of the Treaty.
In 2002, the state and Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei entered into negotiations
to resolve outstanding historical claims under the Treaty. The negotiations led
to two key outcomes. Under the Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Claims Settlement Act
2012 (New Zealand), the state recognized that historical breaches of the Treaty
“diminished the ability of Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei to exercise mana whenua” over
their traditional lands.197 The negotiations also eventually led to a Collective
Redress Scheme, which sought to resolve the competing claims of the Ngāti
Whātua, Ngāti Paoa, and Marutūāhu iwis over Crown land within the Auckland
isthmus.198 Section 120 of the Ngā Mana Whenua o Tāmaki Makaurau Collective
Redress Act 2014 (New Zealand)199 provided that land required for another treaty
settlement would be removed from land covered under this Act.
In 2016, the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations advised that he
intended to transfer several Crown-owned properties located within an area
covered by the Collective Redress Scheme to the Ngāti Paoa and Marutūāhu
iwis, in part settlement of their claims for historic treaty breaches. Ngāti Whātua
Ōrākei challenged this decision, claiming mana whenua over the properties and
contending that it would breach the provisions of their 2012 Settlement Act. They
sought a declaration that, among other things, the Crown must “appropriately
194. Nicola R Wheen & Janine Hayward, “The Meaning of Treaty Settlements and the Evolution
of the Treaty Settlement Process” in Nicola R Wheen & Janine Hayward, eds, Treaty of
Waitangi Settlements (Bridget Williams Books, 2012) 13 at 17.
195. Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ), 1975/114, s 5(1)(a) [Waitangi Act 1975].
196. Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 (NZ), 1985/148, s 3, amending Waitangi Act 1975,
supra note 195, s 6(1).
197. Claims Settlement Act, supra note 4, s 6(13).
198. New Zealand, Office of Treaty Settlements, Ngā Mana Whenua o Tāmaki Makaurau
Collective Redress Deed (5 December 2012) online (pdf ): <www.govt.nz/assets/Documents/
OTS/Tamaki-Makaurau/Tamaki-Makaurau-Deed-of-Settlement-5-Dec-2012.pdf>.
199. 2014/52.
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consult” them as the iwi having title to the land. The transfer was initially
intended to be completed via administrative action, but following the filing of
the Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei claim, the Minister determined that the transfer would
instead be implemented by legislation. The government then sought to strike
out the Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei claim, arguing that judicial review would require
the court to impermissibly interfere with proceedings in Parliament. The High
Court and Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the claim was a “quintessentially
political”200 decision and that it is “wrong in principle for a court to declare
unlawful an outcome intended to be secured only if authorised by Parliament.”201
In Ngāti Whātua, the Supreme Court of New Zealand allowed the appeal in part
and remitted the matter to the High Court for hearing.
The decision does not recognize a general obligation on the part of Parliament
to consult with Māori when their interests are specifically affected. Rather, the
decision turned on the characterization of the Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei claim.
While the High Court and Court of Appeal held that the claim concerned a
challenge to legislative proposals, the Supreme Court characterized it as a claim
about their existing rights.202 Courts have a responsibility to determine existing
rights,203 even if they touch “on the subject-matter of a Bill.”204
Consequently, although the Ngati Whatua Ōrākei were successful in
this case, the decision may be of limited utility for Māori more generally. The
Court was careful to acknowledge that the principle of non-interference in the
parliamentary process operates to preclude any non-statutory requirement that
Parliament consult with Māori in the development and drafting of legislation
that will affect their interests. Indeed, the Supreme Court confirmed that the
judiciary will not influence “what should be placed before Parliament”205 and
that the principle “exists to ensure that Parliament is free to consider what it
will and Ministers are free to put before it suggestions for it to consider.”206
Furthermore, consistent with the application of parliamentary supremacy in
Aotearoa New Zealand, while Māori may seek judicial determination of their
existing legal rights, “Parliament remains free to legislate to modify or abrogate
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any existing rights” “without inquiring into [their] existence…or waiting for
court determination of them.”207

III. RECONCILING COMPETING PRINCIPLES
Maloney, Mikisew Cree, and Ngāti Whātua rest on distinct constitutional
frameworks. However, in each case, the highest courts in Australia, Canada,
and Aotearoa New Zealand refrained from finding a general duty owed by their
parliament to consult with Indigenous peoples when developing and drafting
legislation that specifically affects Indigenous communities. Considered together,
these three cases shed light on a fundamental tension for settler states with
Westminster-derived constitutional frameworks. In each case, the court has been
clear to emphasize that the normative commitment underlying parliamentary
supremacy does not allow the judiciary to impose such a duty on the parliament.
Although it is not specifically characterized in this way, Indigenous peoples’
collective right to self-determination has been subsumed within a hierarchical
model that privileges the principle of parliamentary supremacy.
This outcome follows parliamentary supremacy’s construction of a singular
people. Even where Indigenous peoples are recognized by state law as holding
distinct rights, Indigenous peoples remain conceived primarily as members of the
settler-state polity. Distinctive Indigenous rights are seen (with some suspicion) as
an adjunct or “special” entitlement ordinarily in violation of principles of equality
and non-discrimination.208 Reflecting this understanding, Indigenous peoples’
rights are treated as human rights or rights of cultural minorities rather than
governance rights. More than simply conceiving rights in an individual and not
collective sense, this view presupposes some relationship of subordination. Unlike
governance rights that inhere within Indigenous communities and exist outside
the state, human rights are located entirely within state law. As a consequence of
this, there is no need to recognize a sui generis entitlement allowing Indigenous
peoples and communities to be heard in the law-making process.
In light of these decisions, it is clear that reconciling Indigenous peoples’
right to self-determination and the principle of parliamentary supremacy requires

207. Ibid at para 115, Elias CJ.
208. See Kirsty Gover, “Settler-State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2015) 26 Eur J Intl L 345; Benedict Kingsbury, “Reconciling
Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and
Comparative Law” (2001) 34 NYUJ Intl L & Pol 189.
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“legal reformation.”209 Our understanding of constitutional principles and values,
like parliamentary supremacy, must be reconsidered “so as to reshape the law’s
relation to” Indigenous peoples and allow Indigenous communities “to devise
institutional arrangements that conform to and celebrate [their] forms of life.”210
In this Part, I draw back from the particular politico-legal framework within
which each case emerged to explore how the constitutional relationship between
Indigenous peoples and the state can be restructured by distributing governance
rights more equitably.211
A. TWO APPROACHES

Two approaches can be considered. The first may be characterized as the “melting
pot” approach. This is the position of the unanimous court in Maloney, the majority
in Mikisew Cree, and the accepted grounding across the two judgments in Ngāti
Whātua. As explained above, this approach posits that, although consultation
may be advantageous in practice for both normative and instrumental reasons,
absent statutory language, it is not required and the judiciary will not interrogate
the parliamentary process. The anomalous position of Indigenous peoples and
communities in settler states does not alter the operation of the principle.
Although the competence of each settler state parliament may be limited in
important respects, its authority to draft, introduce, deliberate, and enact
legislation in areas within its competence is unbounded.212 As a representative
institution, the legislature is accountable to the people considered as a whole,
and it is not obligated to consult with specific individuals or communities when
carrying out its business.
The melting pot approach may reflect existing law in Australia, Canada, and
Aotearoa New Zealand, but the foundations on which it is built are dubious to
say the least. As many Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars have explained,
the initial and continuing existence of each state is predicated on the unjust
displacement of Indigenous peoples and nations from their traditional lands and
the ongoing dismissal of Indigenous assertions of sovereignty. In fact, the state
209. Macklem, supra note 8 at 395 [emphasis in original].
210. Ibid. See also Nichols & Hamilton supra note 8
211. Patrick Macklem, “Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples” (1993)
45 Stan L Rev 1311.
212. On the distinction between competence and authority in this context, see Elias, “Mapping”,
supra note 22 at 14. See also Sir Anthony Mason, “One Vote, One Value v The Parliamentary
Tradition—The Federal Experience” in Christopher Forsyth & Ivan Hare, eds, The Golden
Metwand and the Crooked Cord: Essays on Public Law in Honour of Sir William Wade QC
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 333 at 335.
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legal systems that have developed largely continue to marginalize or ignore the
fact that Indigenous peoples did not cede sovereignty, constructing an elaborate
artifice that elides critical questions concerning how the British Crown acquired
Indigenous lands.213 Although today recognized as a legal fiction, that artifice
continues to exert a powerful hold over the state, undergirding state actors’ efforts
to deny Indigenous peoples’ political authority.214 This legal construct can be
marshalled to deny the normative significance of Indigenous peoples’ status as prior
self-governing communities,215 erase the existence of their “shared membership in
separate or overlapping polities,”216 and position Indigenous peoples as part of an
undifferentiated mass of formally equal citizens. If Indigenous peoples are simply
one part of the larger political community, then no conflict with parliamentary
supremacy arises. Indigenous citizens may, like all other members of the state,
vote, lobby, or seek to be heard before parliamentary committees.217
This story does not hold. While the legal artifice may not have been
disbanded, each state has partially and belatedly acknowledged the unsatisfactory
explanation underlying its claim to political authority.218 Each has also recognized
that Indigenous peoples and communities are normatively distinct. In addition
to recognizing this both in constitutional instruments and legislation, Australia,

213. See generally David Ritter, “The ‘Rejection of Terra Nullius’ in Mabo: A Critical Analysis”
(1996) 18 Sydney L Rev 5; Daniel Lavery, “No Decorous Veil: The Continuing Reliance
on an Enlarged Terra Nullius Notion in Mabo [No 2]” (2019) 43 Melbourne UL Rev 233;
Douglas (Amo Binashii) Sanderson, “The Residue of Imperium: Property and Sovereignty on
Indigenous Lands” (2018) 68 UTLJ 319 at 322; NZ, Waitangi Tribunal, He Whakaputanga
me te Tiriti: The Declaration and the Treaty (2014) at 526-27; Robert Miller et al,
Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford
University Press, 2012).
214. Claire Charters, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in New Zealand
Courts: A Case for Cautious Optimism” in Centre for International Governance Innovation,
ed, UNDRIP Implementation: Comparative Approaches, Indigenous Voices from CANZUS,
Special Report (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2020) 43 at 51.
215. Robert Nichols, “Contract and Usurpation: Enfranchisement and Racial Governance in
Settler-Colonial Contexts” in Audra Simpson & Andrea Smith, eds, Theorizing Native Studies
(Duke University Press, 2014) 99 at 111.
216. David Myer Temin, Remapping the World: Vine Deloria, Jr and the Ends of Settler Sovereignty
(DPhil Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2016) at 96 [unpublished].
217. Maloney HCA, supra note 1 at para 135, Crennan J; Mikisew Cree, supra note 2 at
para 124, Brown J.
218. See e.g. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Recognition Act 2013 (Cth), 2013/18;
Constitution Act, 1982, s 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11;
Waitangi Act 1975, supra note 195.
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Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand have endorsed the UNDRIP.219 Endorsement
may have been qualified in important respects, including over whether and the
extent to which Indigenous peoples are entitled to be consulted in decisions
over matters that affect them,220 but that act nonetheless signals an acceptance
that Indigenous peoples hold special and distinctive rights. In some cases, that
acceptance has been extended to express recognition that Indigenous peoples’
rights could impose restrictions on parliamentary practice.
Consider Aotearoa New Zealand as an example. While the current legal
position is that the Treaty of Waitangi is effective only to the extent it is recognized
in legislation,221 there are suggestions that it nonetheless “may indicate limits
in our polity on majority decision-making.”222 At this stage, any limits that do
exist are largely political rather than legal,223 though this is not to say that legal
limits will not develop. Indeed, writing extra-curially, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court Dame Sian Elias acknowledged that there is an argument that
“the sovereignty obtained by the British Crown was a sovereignty qualified by
the Treaty,” and noted that the scope of that qualification has “never been fully
explored to date.”224
Inchoate as this instance of recognition may be, it is nonetheless important,
for it affirms the position that the melting pot conception is unattractive or
219. See Jenny Macklin, Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous
Affairs, Speech, 418T6, “Statement on the United Nations Declaration On the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” (3 April 2009), online: Parliament of Australia <parlinfo.aph.gov.au/
parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/
418T6%22?fbclid=IwAR2faHOHMV4Elj7jkv2RTAmqtwZId5CxYk17XAcS12pilv
XexqSEN4xoZKo> ; Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs,
Speech, “Speech delivered at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,
New York, May 10” (10 May 2016), online: Government of Canada <www.canada.ca/
en/indigenous-northern-affairs/news/2016/05/speech-delivered-at-the-united-nationspermanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues-new-york-may-10-.html>; Simon Power,
Minister of Justice, Ministerial Statement, “UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples—Government Support” (20 April 2010), online: Parliament of New Zealand <www.
parliament.nz/en/pb/hansard-debates/rhr/document/49HansD_20100420_00000071/
ministerial-statements-un-declaration-on-the-rights-of>.
220. See UNGAOR, 61st Sess, 107th Plen Mtg, UN Doc A/61/PV.107 (2007) at 11, 13, 14.
On the complicated nature of these qualifications, see Gover, supra note 208.
221. Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board, [1941] AC 308 at 324-25 (PC);
Ngati Apa Ki Te Waipounamu Trust v Attorney-General (2002), [2003] 1 NZLR 779 (HC).
222. NZ, Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual 2017 (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
2017) at 2. A former Chief Justice of the New Zealand Supreme Court has cautioned against
dismissing this position. See Elias, “Mapping”, supra note 22 at 16.
223. Palmer, supra note 22 at 151-52.
224. Elias, “Sovereignty”, supra note 21 at 153.
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inappropriate for settler states. Indigenous peoples may be members of the state
but they also hold differentiated citizenship by virtue of their status as prior
self-governing communities who have never ceded sovereignty—whether or
not that position is recognized by treaty or in law. If Indigenous peoples have
never ceded sovereignty and continue to conceive of and organize themselves as
normatively distinct communities within and outside the state, an alternative effort
at mediating parliamentary supremacy and self-determination must be adopted.
The current approach takes the existing distribution of political power for
granted. We have seen, however, that this approach is built on legal and factual
inaccuracies—and that state actors largely accept as much. What is to be done?
An alternative approach maintains that the better choice is to begin from
the legal, political, and social fact of Indigenous peoples’ right to sovereignty
and self-determination. In essence, it asks state actors to follow through
in their thinking. If the state accepts that Indigenous peoples have a right to
self-determination, what follows? This position can also be articulated as the “a
priori” conception. While Indigenous peoples’ collective rights may or may not
be expressly or implicitly recognized or protected in a settler state’s constitution,
by virtue of Indigenous peoples’ status as prior self-governing communities who
have never ceded sovereignty, those rights are implicitly reserved or antecedent to
the state and its constitution. As such, they operate as a limitation on both each
Crown and parliament, albeit a limitation that is, today, largely unrecognized.
Justice Joe Williams, now of the New Zealand Supreme Court, explains, noting
that if the Treaty of Waitangi “is truly a founding document, and was truly entered
into in good faith as between the parties, then the Treaty itself was—is—the Law.
Either orthodox (English) views of the law must change to accommodate its
existence or it really was just a trick to pacify savages.”225
The consequences of this approach may appear radical. Certainly, in particular
forms it carries the potential of fundamentally restructuring the distribution of
political power within the state or possibly even overturning the state—a project
supported by some, though not all, Indigenous peoples. This is not necessarily the
case, however. While Indigenous peoples’ rights may be conceptually considered
antecedent to the state, the manifestation or exercise of those rights in practice
will likely fall along a spectrum. It does not necessarily or inexorably require
the rejection of the existing constitutional framework. Rather, it envisages the

225. Joe Williams, “Not Ceded But Redistributed” in William Renwick, ed, Sovereignty &
Indigenous Rights: The Treaty of Waitangi in International Contexts (Victoria University Press,
1991) 190 at 193 [emphasis in original].
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creation of “space for the articulation of multiple, overlapping sovereignties that
can meaningfully accommodate Indigenous self-determination.”226
This point reflects both pragmatic and principled considerations.
Instrumentally, the increasing complexity of personal and legal relations in
contemporary society means that the interests and aspirations of Indigenous and
non-Indigenous peoples are intertwined; disassembling the existing framework
under which people have organized their lives may produce further injustices.227
At the same time, implementing Indigenous peoples’ collective rights to
self-determination should be understood as contributing to or reflecting a deeper
normative commitment to fair and equitable relationships between political
communities. Of course, this encompasses the ability of Indigenous peoples to
“exercise some degree of sovereign decision-making power,”228 but in areas outside
the exclusive jurisdiction of Indigenous nations, it also includes a commitment
to intercultural dialogue and consultation. In other words, a form of shared rule
over issues that affect both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.
A form of shared rule already exists in some domains in Australia, Canada,
and Aotearoa New Zealand. For instance, in each state, lands and waters are
often managed in partnership. Typically, this is conducted by a board comprising
of government-appointed Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons who oversee
planning and management of certain areas. If conducted on a firm basis of formal
recognition and active participation in decision-making processes, collaborative
land and resource planning can empower local communities by ensuring that
Indigenous values are considered and expressed in developing management
strategies. One noteworthy example is the Te Urewera Act 2014 (New Zealand),
which establishes a board to manage Te Urewera, “a fortress of nature, alive
with history” and “a place of spiritual value” in the north island of Aotearoa
New Zealand.229 In undertaking its functions the Te Urewera Board may “give
expression to” Tūhoetanga and Tūhoe “concepts of management”230 and “must
consider and provide appropriately for the relationship of iwi and hapū and
their culture and traditions with Te Urewera when making decisions.”231 The
226. Nichols & Hamilton, supra note 8 at 348. See also Duncan Ivison, “Justification, Not
Recognition” (2016) 8 Indigenous L Bull 12.
227. Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) 103 Ethics 4; Douglas Sanderson,
“Redressing the Right Wrong: The Argument from Corrective Justice” (2012) 62 UTLJ 93.
228. Stacey, supra note 182 at 407.
229. 2014/51, ss 3(1)-(2).
230. Ibid, s 18(2).
231. Ibid, s 20(1). See also Jacinta Ruru, Special Issue, Te Urewera Act 2014 (2014) October
Maori L Rev 16.
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Te Urewera Act does not fully capture all dimensions of Māori worldview and
law,232 but it remains an innovative politico-legal arrangement that re-envisages
co-management regimes towards a “bicultural”233 model of preservation. In any
event, even if there are further steps to take, the key point here is that the existence
of these institutions demonstrates that shared rule as a concept is not anathema
to settler nations. The challenge here is establishing a similar framework for the
legislative process.
B. A FRAMEWORK FOR ENGAGEMENT

Introducing a justiciable duty to consult specific communities in the law-making
process may run contrary to the principle of parliamentary supremacy, but
Indigenous peoples are entitled to be heard in the design and drafting of legislation
that affects them. In this section, I argue that these two principles can be reconciled
by decoupling the existence of a duty from the question of adjudication. The
framework to facilitate engagement between two or more political communities
that I outline imposes a political or non-justiciable obligation on each parliament
to consult. In doing so, it recognizes that the judiciary is not “the only branch of
[government] with a stake in securing the constitutional order.”234 At the same
time, the framework starts from the position that Indigenous communities and
non-Indigenous communities are both entitled to exercise self-determination
within the state. Both Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities share
political power within the constitutional order.
Two points should be noted before setting out this approach. First, the
framework aims at facilitating engagement; it does not require or guarantee that
meaningful consultation will take place. In effect, the framework is a political
mechanism that seeks to impose a moral rather than legal obligation on the
legislature to engage. In this sense, it aims to bring the rights and interests of
Indigenous peoples into conversation with existing governance institutions and

232. Carwyn Jones, New Treaty, New Tradition: Reconciling New Zealand and Maori Law
(UBC Press, 2016).
233. Jacinta Ruru, “A Treaty in Another Context: Creating Reimagined Treaty Relationships in
Aotearoa New Zealand” in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship:
Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties (University of Toronto Press,
2017) 305 at 320.
234. Vanessa A MacDonnell, “Rethinking the Invisible Constitution: How Unwritten
Constitutional Principles Shape Political Decision-Making” (2019) 65 McGill LJ 175
at 205. See also Aileen Kavanagh, “Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to
Relationships” (2019) 30 King’s LJ 43.
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state actors with the goal of building a relational ethic.235 It will not always be
simple nor effective. Nonetheless, reflecting its status as a mechanism to facilitate
dialogue and discussion across and between political communities that share
the land, it is anticipated that failure to abide by or act consistently with the
obligation would attract censure within and outside the parliament.
Second, consultation may, but will not necessarily, lead to amendment or
alteration to any bill. Although it is expected that consultation will inform and
educate members of parliament over the likely impact of their draft legislation
on specific communities, potentially enhancing the likelihood of changes to the
final draft, there is no justiciable requirement that can compel a parliament to
withdraw or amend particular provisions. While the framework may appear weak
or inadequate, it aims to meaningfully reconcile Indigenous communities’ right
to be heard within a modified form of parliamentary supremacy attuned to the
position of settler states. It does so by recognizing that “the appropriate recourse
in some circumstances lies through the workings of the political process rather
than the courts.”236 However, its starting point constitutes a significant step up
in existing law.
Commencing from the fact of Indigenous self-determination marks a
fundamental shift in the burden of reasoning. Rather than requiring Indigenous
peoples and communities to demonstrate how consultation obligations are
consistent with parliamentary supremacy or do not interfere with parliamentary
processes, this approach constructs a framework for engagement by prompting
two questions. First, is this an issue on which Indigenous peoples should be
heard? If the answer is yes, the question then becomes: How can their right to be
heard be given effect?237
Consider the first question. There may be many issues in which Indigenous
peoples (and, indeed, non-Indigenous peoples) wish to have their voices specifically
heard. It is therefore necessary to draw a clear line for when consultation is or is
not required. One approach has been developed by Sámi legal scholar Matthias
Åhrén. Although Åhrén’s “sliding scale”238 of self-determination is primarily
focused on ascertaining when Indigenous communities may be entitled to

235. See John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism (University of Toronto Press,
2016); Harry Hobbs & Stephen Young, “Modern Treaty Making and the Limits of the Law”
(2021) 71 UTLJ 234.
236. Reference re Secession, supra note 39 at para 102.
237. For a similar approach, see Courtoreille 2016, supra note 163 at para 84, Pelletier JA.
238. Åhrén, supra note 90 at 138-43.
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exercise jurisdictional powers, it is also useful to consider when consultation may
be necessary. As Åhrén explains:
It perhaps make[s] sense to posit that the more important the issue to the indigenous
people’s culture, society, and way of life, the greater influence the people should
be allowed to exercise over the decision-making process. Conversely, if the matter
is of little significance to the indigenous people, but important to the welfare of
society at large, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination may only award
the indigenous people with limited influence over the decision-making process.
Obviously, there are also matters in between.239

Åhrén’s approach suggests that consultation is only required on issues that affect
Indigenous peoples in some material way. It may not, for example, be appropriate
for Indigenous peoples to be specifically consulted on issues that affect them
only generally, such as in the drafting of a law concerning industrial relations or
pay-roll taxation. This is sensible and accords with the views of other scholars.
Zachary Davis, for instance, argues that the obligation to consult should be
triggered by “conduct leading to the development and enactment of legislation
with the potential to adversely affect claimed Aboriginal rights.”240 In a different
context, Shireen Morris has argued that Indigenous peoples should be able to
comment on laws that are “directed at, or significantly or especially impacting,
Indigenous people.”241 Similarly, Cheryl Saunders would require consultation
“when Indigenous interests are affected ‘directly’, but not in relation to ‘matters
of a general nature…assumed to affect the society as a whole’,”242 while Cobble
Cobble woman and law professor Megan Davis, and non-Indigenous scholar
Rosalind Dixon would do so when legislation “significantly or disproportionally”
affects Indigenous peoples.243 Notwithstanding the diversity in language, all seem
to agree on a key point: Consultation is required only when the particular issue
will materially affect Indigenous peoples in some way over and above other citizens
of the state, although when that standard is met will be the subject of debate.
239. Ibid at 139.
240. Zachary Davis, “The Duty to Consult and Legislative Action” (2016) 79 Sask L Rev 17 at 18.
241. Austl, Commonwealth, Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition Relating to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Submission No 195 by Shireen Morris (Joint
Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition Relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples, 2018) at 18.
242. Cheryl Saunders, “Indigenous Constitutional Recognition: The Concept of Consultation”
(2015) 8 ILB 19 at 21.
243. Megan Davis & Rosalind Dixon, “Constitutional Recognition through a (Justiciable)
Duty to Consult? Towards Entrenched and Judicially Enforceable Norms of Indigenous
Consultation,” Comment, (2016) 27 Pub L Rev 255 at 262.
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Identifying this standard in the abstract will not resolve challenges in
practice. Ascertaining when consultation is required may sometimes be politically
contentious. Indigenous communities like those in Bwgcolman, the Mikisew
Cree First Nation, or the Ngāti Whātua iwi may disagree with the legislature as
to whether a bill or draft proposal would affect their rights and interests to the
requisite standard. Where that occurs, Indigenous peoples and communities may
gain little clear advantage from this framework. This will not necessarily be the
case, however. If the framework can be embedded within the constitutional order,
the parliament should recognize its moral obligations to take its duty to engage
seriously. Whether that occurs may ultimately rely on the initial posture adopted
by the parliament, the personal relationships developed between members of
the legislature and Indigenous communities, and the quality of the consultation
process, but the parliament will remain constitutionally obliged to engage.
The second question may be more difficult. Assuming that consultation
is required, how should it occur? Two general points are worth noting at the
outset. First, Indigenous peoples and communities will often be ill-prepared
to consult with the legislature. Significant financial and material disparities are
likely to structure any process, and remote communities may have little time or
capacity to engage sufficiently with the detail of proposed legislative changes.
Second, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Each settler state will adopt and
adapt a process that makes sense in its circumstances. Reflecting the diversity
of Indigenous communities in Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand,
that process may be different according to the circumstances and aspirations of
individual First Nations. This is natural and should not be greeted with anxiety or
alarm. One of the very advantages of constructing a framework for engagement
built on the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is the
fact that it allows for flexibility.
Several examples or proposals exist. In Norway, for instance, a representative
body for the Indigenous Sámi people has operated since the late 1980s. Section
2-2 of the Norwegian Sámi Act 1987 provides that public agencies and bodies
“should give the Sameting [Sámi Parliament] an opportunity to express an opinion
before they make decisions on matters coming within the scope of the business
of the Sameting.”244 In 2005, this general obligation to be heard was transformed
into a comprehensive political agreement. The agreement applies to all “matters

244. Norway, The Sámi Act, 1987/56, § 2-2.
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that may affect S[á]mi interests directly,”245 which are defined as encompassing
all material and immaterial forms of Sámi culture, including land-ownership
rights.246 The agreement also covers all forms of decision making, including
legislation, regulations, administrative decisions, guidelines, and governmental
reports. Consultation must be “genuine and effective” and may include
consideration and debate by the Sámi Parliament.247 It does not extend to a veto,
but Cabinet documents must indicate where agreement has not been reached
and the views of the Sameting must “be reflected in the documents submitted.”248
At times, the obligation appears to have worked well. The agreement was
integral to the adoption of the landmark Finnmark Act 2005, which recognized
Sámi rights to land in the northernmost Finnmark County.249 The formal
consultation procedure also strengthened the position of the Sameting in
pushing for amendments to the Reindeer Husbandry Act 1978, which recognized
the traditional siida, “bringing Norwegian law into closer conformity with
traditional S[á]mi land management.”250 Nonetheless, despite some positives,
the experience in Norway has been mixed. There is a perception among Sámi
politicians that while the consultation process “works well in matters of little
significance…in the case of issues of major economic and political importance…
Sámi input is incorporated to a very limited degree.”251 These challenges indicate

245. Norway, Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, Procedures for Consultations
between the State Authorities and The Sami Parliament [Norway] (11 May 2005)
art 2, online: Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation <www.
regjeringen.no/en/topics/indigenous-peoples-and-minorities/Sami-people/midtspalte/
PROCEDURES-FOR-CONSULTATIONS-BETWEEN-STA/id450743>.
246. Ibid.
247. Ibid, art 6.
248. Ibid.
249. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on the situation of the Sami
people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland, UNGAOR, 2011, Annex, Agenda
Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/18/35/Add.2 (2011) at paras 17-18.
250. Ibid at para 19.
251. Adam Stępień, Anna Petrétei & Timo Koivurova, “Sámi Parliaments in Finland, Norway, and
Sweden” in Tove H Malloy, Alexander Osipov & Balázs Vizi, eds, Managing Diversity through
Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies, and Risks (Oxford University
Press, 2015) 117 at 130. For a recent example of inadequate consultation, see Tiina Sanila
Aikio & Vibeke Larsen, Presidents of Saami Parliament in Finland and Norway, Statement,
“The Tana Agreement – A severe violation of the human rights of the Saami” (28 March
2017), online: <www.samediggi.fi/2017/03/28/the-tana-agreement-a-severe-violation-of-thehuman-rights-of-the-saami/?lang=en>; Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the
Sixteenth Session, UNESCOR, 2017, Supp No 23, UN Doc E/C.19/2017/11 at para 24.

382

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

that more work needs to be done in entrenching the consultation requirement
within Norway’s constitutional order.
One novel proposal in Australia seeks to resolve the challenges faced in
Norway. In the Uluru Statement from the Heart, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people outline their aspirations for structural reform to the framework
of governance in Australia. The Statement calls for a First Nations Voice—an
Indigenous representative body empowered to advise the federal Parliament on
laws that affect Indigenous peoples—to be established in the Constitution.252
Constitutional amendment in Australia requires a referendum.253 Supporters
of the First Nations Voice argue that the process of constitutional amendment
will embed the body within the constitutional order, building legitimacy and
“political respect.”254 On this account, constitutional entrenchment will not
only strengthen the institution’s independence, but by conferring democratic
legitimacy through a national referendum, it will insert the body “into the public
life (and imagination) of the nation,”255 enhancing the likelihood that Parliament
will take its moral obligations seriously. Whether this results in practice is
difficult to determine. It relies on the development of what non-Indigenous law
professor Gabrielle Appleby and Wamba Wamba First Nations scholar Eddie
Synot have called “constitutionalised institutional listening”; that is, meaningful,
constructive, and ongoing relational dialogue that genuinely listens to Indigenous
peoples on their own terms.256 However, even if this form of democratic listening
emerges, it is likely that on certain issues the Parliament will ignore advice
provided by the First Nations Voice, as the Norwegian Sameting has also found.

252. Uluru Statement, supra note 69. The Statement also calls for a process of treaty making and
truth telling. On early efforts at treaty making across Australia, see Harry Hobbs & George
Williams, “Treaty-Making in the Australian Federation” (2019) 43 Melbourne UL Rev
178; George Williams & Harry Hobbs, Treaty, 2nd (Federation Press, 2020); Harry Hobbs,
Alison Whittaker & Lindon Coombes, eds, Treaty-Making Two Hundred and Fifty Years Later
(Federation Press, 2021).
253. Australian Constitution, supra note 24, s 128.
254. Austl, Commonwealth, Joint Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition Relating to
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, Submission No 479 by Pat Anderson et al (Joint
Select Committee on Constitutional Recognition Relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples, 2018) at 5.
255. Fergal Davis, “The Problem of Authority and the Proposal for an Indigenous Advisory Body”
(2015) 8 Indigenous L Bull 23 at 24. See also Dylan Lino, Constitutional Recognition: First
Peoples and the Australian Settler State (Federation Press, 2018) at 116.
256. Gabrielle Appleby & Eddie Synot, “A First Nations Voice: Institutionalising Political
Listening” (2020) 48 Federal L Rev 529. See also Hobbs, Indigenous Aspirations, supra
note 75 at 215-20.
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Challenges exist, but the proposal has considerable merit. It is a sophisticated
attempt to reconcile Indigenous peoples’ right to be involved in law making
that affects their interests with the principle of parliamentary supremacy. That
political or moral obligations may be inadequate absent legal reformation does
not suggest that a framework for engagement and dialogue is not valuable.
Rather, it emphasizes the distance that settler states must travel before they are
capable of genuinely recognizing Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.
A constitutional framework built on the existence of multiple, overlapping
sovereignties is the key for embedding meaningful and substantive engagement
across and between political communities. A flexible and culturally appropriate
framework for engagement constructed on that edifice could promote dialogue
and square the competing principles of parliamentary supremacy and Indigenous
peoples’ right to self-determination.

IV. CONCLUSION
Australia, Canada, and Aotearoa New Zealand are settler states that have inherited
constitutional traditions developed for a state facing very different circumstances.
One of these traditions is the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. In this
article, I have argued that while parliamentary supremacy reflects and supports a
valuable democratic commitment to equal citizenship, it can serve to challenge
the political authority of separate, prior political communities that also share the
state. In Maloney, Mikisew Cree, and Ngāti Whātua, the reliance on notions of
parliamentary supremacy marginalized Indigenous peoples’ legitimate claims to
political authority. The central challenge that faces all settler states, the challenge
to balance the specific interests of Indigenous peoples with general governance
interests,257 is not satisfactorily met by this approach.
I have argued instead that constitutional traditions should reflect the distinct
position settler states find themselves in. Where multiple political communities
share the land, it is not appropriate for a numerically larger community to act
unilaterally, whether through executive action or legislation, in a manner that
materially affects another political community in some differential way. Rather,
consultation, discussion, and dialogue should be undertaken to ensure that
Indigenous peoples have some control over the development of policy and
drafting of legislation. The framework for engagement that I have sketched does
not conclusively resolve this issue. Although it is hoped that it will enhance
257. Matthew SR Palmer, “Constitutional Realism about Constitutional Protection: Indigenous
Rights under a Judicialized and a Politicized Constitution” (2007) 29 Dal LJ 1 at 29.
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the prospect that the design of legislation will reflect Indigenous communities’
priorities, it cannot guarantee this result. Settler states have some way to go before
they can accept the fact that they share the land with separate and overlapping
political communities that are equally entitled to self-determination.

